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1.

INTRODUCTION

Public corruption is the development issue of the twenty-first
century. A broad consensus has emerged in recent years that
corruption retards development by slowing economic growth,
weakening government institutions, and exacerbating poverty.
Uprooting the systemic, entrenched government corruption that
plagues so many developing countries requires a long-term, multifaceted strategy, but a wide range of players on the international
stage agree that effective criminal prosecution—jailing the bad
guys—must be a cornerstone of the global anti-corruption
campaign. Convictions of corrupt officials not only disrupt corrupt
networks, but also shake up the environment in which corruption
is allowed to flourish, and increase deterrence by “making it clear
to public officials that if they engage in corrupt conduct they will
lose their offices, forfeit illegally acquired wealth, and go to
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prison.”1 Investigations and prosecutions which yield quick and
tangible results, resulting in attention-grabbing headlines and the
potential for deterrence and galvanizing public will, can have a
broad and immediate impact on society that no administrative
reform plan can match. While broad structural measures
addressing the root causes of corruption must be the core of
sustainable reform, the day-to-day presence and pressure of
credible, effective criminal law enforcement is what stimulates and
sustains the momentum of an anti-corruption campaign.2 Or at
least that is the ideal. To act as the catalyst that it is supposed to,
however, law enforcement must be equipped to succeed.
In all countries, public corruption is more difficult than most
other illegal acts to investigate and prosecute. It is a secret crime,
carried out by powerful and often sophisticated perpetrators intent
on silencing potential witnesses and retaining access to the spoils.
Investigative techniques geared toward violent crime and other
single-instance illegalities do not work in the context of entrenched
corruption, where multiple players, often integrated hierarchically,
operate through self-sustaining networks. To be effective against
active, complex public corruption networks, law enforcement
cannot simply examine a few suspected corrupt transactions, but
must deploy a range of criminal statutes and evidence-gathering
procedures to build prosecutable cases. In many countries,
including the United States, criminal investigators and prosecutors
1 Larry Diamond, Diplomacy: Institutions of Accountability, 3 HOOVER DIG.
(1999), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3512991.html.
2 See Hans-Joachim Rieger, Prevention—A Key Factor in Fighting Corruption:
The Role of a New Training Concept, 8 MOSCOW ST. U. SCH. OF PUB. ADMIN.
ELECTRONIC J. (2005) (Russ.), http://www.spa.msu.ru/e-journal/10/101_1.php
(“[L]aw enforcement has an important preventive effect: it may even be
considered a prerequisite for prevention, in that it points at specific corruption
problems, thus helping create the necessary awareness. . . . Without the
prosecution of high-level corruption, the chances of success of specific prevention
measures may be fairly slim.”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and the Criminal
Law, 2 F. ON CRIME & SOC’Y at 3, U.N. Sales No. E.03.IV.2 (2002) (“[T]he criminal
law can play a role as a backstop lying behind the needed structural changes.”);
Claes Sandgren, Combating Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law, 39 INT’L LAW.
717, 728 (2005) (“In order to effectively combat corruption, it is necessary to focus
on the workings of institutions, not individuals. Penal law is therefore of less
importance than one might think. This is not to deny, however, that the criminal
prosecution of corrupt activities—and associated activities, such as money
laundering—may give the business community a strong signal . . . . To charge
high-level individuals, whether in business, public institutions or politics, with
collusive corruption increases the trust of ordinary people in the system and
consequently their support in the fight against corruption.”).
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make productive use of these multi-faceted legal weapons.3 But
investigators and prosecutors in most developing countries still
struggle, amidst the many other obstacles that impede the fight
against corruption, with outdated criminal procedures that do not
support a proactive corruption investigation strategy.4
Both regional anti-corruption conventions and the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”) recognize the
vital role of law enforcement agencies, and contain provisions
which promote legal reforms to better equip them to combat
corruption. While many legal reforms have occurred in recent
years, most of this change has been directed at establishing new
substantive corruption crimes. Still missing in most countries, and
likely to be neglected in the efforts toward comprehensive legal
reform despite their inclusion in the UNCAC, are criminal
procedure revisions necessary to enable law enforcement to
effectively detect, investigate, and prosecute violations of
substantive corruption crimes. Without an infrastructure of
procedural provisions supporting law enforcement’s case-making
activities, the many new corruption crimes added to the statute
books in developing countries may well remain mere windowdressing. The next step to enable law enforcement is a concise,
coherent package of revisions drawn from and beyond the
UNCAC, which, as a unit, deliver more than the parts could alone.
We recognize that legal systems vary greatly, and that a single set
of legal reform prescriptions will not fit all countries. But a model
legislative agenda, focused on proven law enforcement tools only,
can provide the template many developing countries need to
address the circumstances that impede corruption eradication
efforts everywhere.

3 Federal prosecutors in the United States boast very high conviction rates in
public corruption cases. David M. Luna, Bureau of Int’l Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, Strategies to Fight Kleptocracy (Sept. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/92911.htm (claiming an 85% conviction rate
in 5749 individual public corruption offense suits between 2001 and 2005); see also
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE
PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin
/docs/arpt-2006.pdf (detailing operations of the Public Integrity Section).
4 ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia & the Pacific, AntiCorruption Policies in Asia and the Pacific: Progress in Legal and Institutional
Frameworks in 25 Countries, at xvii, Doc. 060106 (2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/31/36832820.pdf
(noting
“the
low
conviction rate in this area of crime in various countries”).
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We present our recommendations in the context of Indonesia—
the world’s fourth largest country and consistently ranked as one
of the most corrupt.5 Having recently rid itself of its long-term
kleptocratic leader, and with a reform-minded president
advancing corruption convictions as a demonstration of the
administration’s anti-corruption resolve, the nation teeters on the
brink of real, sustainable change.6 Many forces press against the
anti-corruption effort in Indonesia, and there are many obstacles to
uncovering and effectively prosecuting corruption crimes.
Criminal investigative procedures are but one of them, but they are
something that can change relatively easily. Despite the fact that
Indonesia ratified the UNCAC in 2006, we observed that many in
law enforcement are not aware of its provisions nor realize how
changes to their antiquated criminal procedure code and other
laws could boost their success rates in corruption cases.7 Our
proposed package of changes provides both a guide for legislative
action and a focus for educating the enforcers to succeed, in
Indonesia and in other developing countries.
We begin this article in Section 2 with a brief discussion of the
problem of corruption in the developing world and the many
elements of a successful anti-corruption strategy. We identify an
effective prosecution capability as an essential part of the broader
5 Although its score has improved somewhat over the past few years,
Indonesia has consistently ranked near the bottom of Transparency International’s
annual corruption perceptions index. See J. GRAF LAMBSDORFF, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL,
2008
CORRUPTION
PERCEPTIONS
INDEX,
available
at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008
(ranking Indonesia 126 out of 180); see also Indonesia Rated Asia’s Most Corrupt,
ONENEWS, Mar. 8, 2005, http://tvnz.co.nz/view/news_world_story_skin
/478317%3Fformat=html (citing rankings of the Political and Economic Risk
Consultancy Ltd., which polled over 900 expatriate respondents across Asia).
6 SOREN DAVIDSEN ET AL., CURBING CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA 2004–2006: A
SURVEY OF NATIONAL POLICIES AND APPROACHES 20 (2006), available at
http://www.usindo.org/publications/reports/pdf/korupsi_web.pdf (citing 2004
comments from Indonesian President Susilo Yudhoyono that approvingly refer to
prosecutions as “shock therapy”).
7 Indonesia ratified the UNCAC by adopting Law Number 7 of 2006, in April
of that year. Indonesia’s independent Corruption Eradication Commission
(known in Indonesia as the KPK) has analyzed its legal code to identify where
changes need to be made to conform to UNCAC’s requirements. CORRUPTION
ERADICATION COMMISSION, GAP ANALYSIS STUDY REPORT: IDENTIFICATION OF GAP
BETWEEN LAWS/REGULATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (1st ed. 2006), available at
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Publications/E-BookUNCAC-Gap-Analysis-3.pdf [hereinafter KPK GAP REPORT].
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strategy, and then discuss that need in the context of Indonesia’s
efforts to battle entrenched corruption. In Section 3, we discuss the
major criminal enforcement challenges in the investigation and
prosecution of public corruption. We point out the difficulties
inherent in investigating and prosecuting corruption crimes and
identify the tools and techniques necessary to address them—
measures that Indonesia and many other developing countries lack
and critically need. In Section 4, we identify gaps in the
Indonesian criminal and procedure codes with respect to these
important tools and techniques. We set out a proposed legislative
agenda in Section 5, tailored to respond to our observations in
Indonesia, but a helpful model for the many other developing
countries seeking to hone their criminal procedures to meet the
challenges that public corruption presents.
2.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE BATTLE AGAINST ENTRENCHED
CORRUPTION

2.1. The Crucial Role of Enforcement in a Comprehensive Anti
Corruption Campaign
Public corruption8 can take many forms, including bribery,
embezzlement, theft, fraud, extortion, abuse of discretion,
favoritism or nepotism, conflict of interest, and influence
peddling.9 Its magnitude may vary as well, ranging from “grand”
or “political,” which involves the highest levels of national
8 In its 1997 Anti-Corruption Strategy, the World Bank defined public
corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain.” World Bank, Poverty
Reduction and Economic Management, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The
Role of the World Bank, at 8 (Sept. 1997), available at http://www1.worldbank.org
/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf.
Others employ broader
definitions, which include corruption by private actors as well as public
employees. See Transparency International, Frequently Asked Questions About
Corruption, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last
visited Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter TI FAQs] (defining corruption as the “misuse of
entrusted power for private gain”).
9 Petter Langseth, Measuring Corruption, in MEASURING CORRUPTION 7, 10–14
(Charles Sampford et al. eds., 2006) (describing the different techniques and
categories of corruption); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], U.N. Dev.
Programme, Tackling Corruption, Transforming Lives: Accelerating Human
Development in Asia and the Pacific, at 19, U.N. Sales No. E.08.III.B.2 (2008), available
at
http://www.undprcc.lk/ext/crhdr/crhd_report/RHDR_Full%20Report
_Tackling_Corruption_Transforming_Lives.pdf
[hereinafter
U.N.
Dev.
Programme Report] (focusing on corruption in the Asian and Pacific countries
from a human development perspective).
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government and results in distortion of central government
functions, to “petty” or “bureaucratic,” which involves the
exchange of small amounts of money or favors and exists within
the established government framework.10 Corruption can be
episodic or entrenched. Entrenched corruption is pervasive—few
alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials exist; organized—
corrupt officials coordinate, vertically or horizontally to sustain the
system; and monopolistic—extensive corruption faces little political
or social opposition.11 This kind of systemic, embedded corruption
can exist anywhere, but it is most common in developing countries,
where the institutional structures of lawmaking and public service
delivery are weak, or captured, and run by the will of a corrupt
head of state.
Observers have differed on the degree of damage that
corruption wreaks on developing governments and economies.
“Revisionists” in the 1960s countered the traditional view that
public corruption impedes modernization, arguing that corruption
is a positive force in development, promoting economic efficiency
and enhancing political participation, trust, and stability.12 More
recent empirical studies challenge these conclusions generally,
even as a number of them confirm an “East Asian paradox,”
whereby in a number of developing nations in that area, including
Indonesia, systemic corruption coexisted with high levels of
economic growth.13 But the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s,
10 Michael Johnston & Alan Doig, Different Views on Good Government and
Sustainable Anticorruption Strategies, in CURBING CORRUPTION: TOWARD A MODEL FOR
BUILDING NATIONAL INTEGRITY 13, 15 (Rick Stapenhurst & Sahr J. Kpundeh eds.,
1999) (explaining the difference between political and bureaucratic corruption);
U.N. Dev. Programme Report, supra note 9, at 20 (explaining the difference
between grand and petty corruption).
11 Johnston & Doig, supra note 10, at 13–14.
12 See SAUMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 69
(1968) (offering the “grease” hypothesis, under which the ability of government
employees to levy bribes makes them work harder); ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL
THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (4th ed. 1968); David Bayley, The Effects of
Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 W. POL. Q. 719, 719 (1967) (arguing that
bribery is a development stage with positive and negative effects); Nathaniel H.
Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption, 8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
8, 10–11 (1964) (offering the “speed money” hypothesis, under which corruption
makes economic transactions easier by eliminating bureaucratic delay); Paolo
Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681, 681 (1995) (“The debate on the
effects of corruption is particularly fervent. . . . [S]ome authors have suggested
that corruption might raise economic growth . . . .”).
13 J. Edgardo Campos et al., Corruption and Its Implications for Investment, in
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caused at least in part by the market distortions wreaked by
widespread corruption, took the luster off the regional
exceptionalism.14 Most recently, expert opinion across a wide
range of sources—including academics,15 government officials,
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations
(“NGOs”), the media, and business interests—has coalesced
around the conclusion that public corruption is a malign factor16
that negatively impacts effective government,17 economic growth,18
CORRUPTION: THE BOOM AND BUST OF EAST ASIA 11 (J. Edgardo Campos ed., 2001)
(describing the “East Asian puzzle”); Andrew Wedeman, Development and
Corruption: The East Asian Paradox, in POLITICAL BUSINESS IN EAST ASIA 34 (Edmund
Gomez ed., 2001); Seung-Hyun Lee & Kyeungrae Kenny Oh, Corruption in Asia:
Pervasiveness and Arbitrariness, 24 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 97, 98–100 (2007) (noting that
“many Asian countries with quite high levels of corruption show high levels of
economic development as well,” and offering the hypothesis that high economic
development can exist where corruption is pervasive, but not arbitrary).
14 U.N. Dev. Programme Report, supra note 9, at 32–33; Sandgren, supra note
2, at 718 (“Even in Asia, which has traditionally had a high level of acceptance of
corruption, a new view has emerged. . . . [In light of the 1997 financial crisis], [t]he
previous view that corruption facilitated decision-making and thus helped
economic progress in the region is no longer viable.”).
15 Daniel Kaufman, Anticorruption Strategies: Starting Afresh? Unconventional
Lessons from Comparative Analysis, in CURBING CORRUPTION: TOWARD A MODEL FOR
BUILDING NATIONAL INTEGRITY, supra note 10, at 35, 39 (offering an empirical
challenge to the “grease” and “speed money” arguments); Eric C. C. Chang &
Yun-han Chu, Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies?, 68 J. POL.
259, 269 (2006) (finding that “the level of citizens’ perceptions of corruption
decreases their trust toward political institutions”); Johann Graf Lambsdorff,
Corruption in Empirical Research—A Review, 9th International Anti-Corruption
Conference (Dec. 10–15, 1999) at 2 (surveying the literature and finding a
correlation between corruption and adverse economic effects).
16 U.N. Dev. Programme—Oslo Governance Centre, Democratic Governance
Fellowship Programme, The Impact of Corruption on the Human Rights Based
Approach to Development, at 9 (Sept. 2004) (prepared by Thusitha Pilapitiya)
[hereinafter Oslo Report] (“The negative impact of corruption on development is
no longer questioned.”).
17 Chang & Chu, supra note 15, at 259 (Corruption “recklessly violates the
fundamental principles of democracy—such as accountability, equality, and
openness”); see TI FAQs, supra note 8 (“[C]orruption—misusing publicly
entrusted power for private gain—is inherently contradictory and irreconcilable
with democracy.”).
18 See, e.g., J. Eduardo Campos et al., The Impact of Corruption on Investment:
Predictability Matters, 27 WORLD DEV. 1059, 1065 (1999) (concluding that empirical
evidence shows corruption impedes growth); Daniel Kaufmann et al., Measuring
Corruption: Myths and Realities, DEV. OUTREACH, Sept. 2006, available at
http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/september06/article.asp?id=371
(stating that many falsely believe there is no need to monitor countries with high
corruption, as they also have high economic growth; however, studies have
shown that corruption adversely affects growth in the long term); Mauro, supra
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and the protection of public and individual human rights in
developing countries.19
Wide recognition of the devastating effects of corruption on
economics, political stability, and human rights globally has led to
the emergence of a broad-based and increasingly powerful
international anti-corruption movement.20 Its many efforts to
note 12, at 705 (discussing studies that show corrupt countries with high growth
would have even more growth without corruption); Andrew White, The Paradox of
Corruption as Antithesis to Economic Development: Does Corruption Undermine
Economic Development in Indonesia and China and Why are the Experiences Different in
Each Country?, 8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2006) (“While nearly all participants
in the debate appear to agree that corruption ultimately is antithetical to longterm economic development, the extent to which it positively or negatively affects
economic development in the short term depends upon highly contextual
factors.”).
19 The Secretary-General, Statement on the Adoption by the General
Assembly of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Oct. 31, 2003),
available
at
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background
/secretary-general-speech.html (“Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by
diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government’s ability to
provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign
investment and aid.”); Oslo Report, supra note 16, at 9 (“The Seoul findings [from
the 11th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Seoul, May 2003] declared that
large scale corruption should be designated a crime against humanity, as for
many around the world it falls into the same category as torture, genocide and
other crimes against humanity that rob humans of human dignity . . . and
confirmed the conviction that all human beings have a basic human right to live in
a corruption-free society.”); see also Alan Doig & Stephen Riley, Corruption and
Anti-Corruption Strategies: Issues and Case Studies from Developing Countries, in
CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 45,
50 (U.N. Dev. Programme ed., 2002), available at http://www.undp.org
/governance/contactcdrom-contents/CONTACT_doc/Corruption_report
/Content.pdf (“There is growing international consensus in development
discourse on the damage that corruption can do to the poor, to economic growth,
and to public integrity.”); Press Release, Transparency International, Corruption
Still Rampant in 70 Countries Says Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 (Oct. 18,
2005) (citing TI Chairman Peter Eigen who stated, “Corruption is a major cause of
poverty as well as a barrier to overcoming it. The two scourges feed off each
other, locking their populations in a cycle of misery.”); U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT [USAID], USAID ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY, at 5,
USAID Doc. PD-ACA-557 (Jan. 2005) (“A strong global consensus has emerged
that addressing corruption and building good governance is essential for the
development of people, markets, and nations.”); Ben W. Heineman, Jr., & Fritz
Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2006, at 75, 76
(“[Corruption is] a major barrier to international development—systemic
misappropriation by kleptocratic governments harms the poor.”).
20 Entities
active in supporting corruption-reduction efforts include
international organizations, governments of developed and developing countries,
development banks and international financial institutions, multinational
corporations, business associations, NGOs, the media, and civil society bodies
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address the problem—the failures, the successes, and the results in
between—have illustrated how difficult the objective of corruption
reduction is to achieve. Systems of entrenched corruption are
complex, have many causes and symptoms, and are often selfreinforcing. To succeed, a strategy to reduce systemic corruption
must be multi-faceted.
A comprehensive anti-corruption strategy includes measures
aimed at prevention—reforming electoral, legislative, civil service,
and administrative procedures to reduce the opportunities for
corruption21—measures aimed at promoting public awareness and
stimulating civil society opposition to the culture of corruption,22
and measures aimed at detecting and punishing acts of
corruption.23 Both intuition and evidence suggest that antiwithin developing countries. BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FIGHTING GLOBAL CORRUPTION: BUSINESS RISK
MANAGEMENT
(2001),
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/fgcrpt/2001/3154.htm (describing how
“[m]any international organizations have been making strides in addressing
international bribery in business transactions, official public corruption, and
transparency issues.”).
21 See, e.g., Jeremy Pope, Elements of a Successful Anticorruption Strategy, in
CURBING CORRUPTION: TOWARD A MODEL FOR BUILDING NATIONAL INTEGRITY, supra
note 10, at 97 (stating that measures include simplifying procedures to remove
gatekeepers; reducing regulatory hurdles and limiting administrators’ discretion
to reduce the opportunities to exact bribes; implementing systems to make public
procurement competitive and transparent; establishing oversight procedures,
including safe avenues through which whistleblowers can report illegal activity;
and enforcing appropriate conflict-of-interest rules); U.N. Dev. Programme
Report, supra note 9, at 113–24 (describing civil service reforms and freedom of
information reforms); Heineman & Heimann, supra note 19, at 75 (discussing
measures that various organizations and nations have enacted to mitigate
corruption).
22 Gerald E. Caiden, A Cautionary Tale: Ten Major Flaws in Combating
Corruption, 10 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 269, 286 (2004) (“[A]n organized public,
triggered by outrageous scandal or prompted by unimpeachable leaders and
other impeccable sources, is a force to be reckoned with . . . . [C]ivic culture has to
be stirred first for without its support corruption fighters will not get far.”); see
also U.N. Dev. Programme Report, supra note 9, at 131–46 (describing the role of
the media and civil society organizations); Sandgren, supra note 2, at 726 (“To
make progress there must be pressure from below. Popular acceptance of
corruption is a powerful ally of corruption.”).
23 Pope, supra note 21, at 99–104 (listing prevention, enforcement, public
awareness, and institution building); see also Jon S.T. Quah, Comparing AntiCorruption Measures in Asian Countries: Lessons to be Learnt, 11 ASIAN REV. PUB.
ADMIN. 71, 77 (1999) (quoting C.V. Narasimhan, a former director of the Central
Bureau of Investigation in India, as grouping anti-corruption measures into
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corruption efforts will likely fail without at least a credible threat of
prosecution and punishment for corrupt acts. Persons in the
developing world rate criminal prosecution at the top of the list of
necessary corruption countermeasures, and may use this gauge to
evaluate governments’ anti-corruption efforts.24
Criminal
convictions make the most visible statement that corruption will
not be tolerated. In countries with an active press, major
corruption prosecutions are big news, and successes have the
potential to raise public awareness, dissipate cynicism, galvanize
civil society groups, and encourage other witnesses to come
forward.25 Effective law enforcement can supply short-term
political capital necessary to sustain public support for long-term
corruption reduction actions, while a failure to deliver can sap
public support, allowing anti-corruption campaigns to atrophy.
One product of the expanding anti-corruption consensus has
been a series of major corruption reduction conventions adopted
by international organizations. These documents manifest the new
intolerance for public corruption, condemning it in various forms
and directing signatories to implement reform measures.26 All the
“preventative, punitive, and promotional”).
24 Daniel Kaufmann surveyed 165 high-level officials in 63 developing
countries in 1996. The rating was about the same for civil society representatives
and all respondents. Kaufmann, supra note 15, at 47–49.
25 See Rieger, supra note 2, at 10 (“Successful law enforcement can generate a
momentum and mobilise [sic] society against corruption.”).
26 World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Econ. Mgmt. Network, Helping
Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, at 58–61 (1997), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf
(stating that conventions adopted by members of various international and
regional organizations have directed member states to enact corruption reform
measures); see, e.g., African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption, July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5; Council of Europe, Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505, Europ. T.S. No. 173
(criminalizing certain corrupt acts); Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development [OECD], Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 105–43 (introducing measures to help member states combat
corruption); Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105–39
(providing OAS members with resources to combat local corruption);
ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, Anti-Corruption Action
Plan for Asia-Pacific (2001), at 2, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd
/38/24/35021642.pdf (recommending a course of action to combat corruption in
Asian countries); cf. U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd3 (2000) (comparing an analogous corruption criminalization provision in U.S.
Code).
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conventions include provisions directed at law enforcement
reform. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(“UNCAC”), which entered into force in September 2005, is the
global articulation of the anti-corruption legal reform movement.
Its comprehensive strategy includes provisions aimed at
preventing corruption, promoting civil society activity, and
enhancing law enforcement.
These efforts are an impressive start.
Most developing
countries now have a range of substantive provisions prohibiting
bribery and other acts of public corruption, although serious
obstacles to effective enforcement of those anti-corruption laws
exist in many of those countries. One such obstacle is the lack of
political will. All too frequently, governments enact laws that
simply list more illegal acts, or increase penalties, without
genuinely committing to enforcing them. Other impediments
include the lack of resources, a lack of training and expertise, a lack
of independence, and the lock that entrenched corruption has on
the criminal justice institutions themselves.27 These problems of
resolve and infrastructure are formidable and must be addressed
in order to create a credible and sustainable law enforcement
capacity. But there is also a fundamental element missing in most
of the developing world, which undermines effective anticorruption enforcement: law enforcement generally lacks an
updated arsenal of procedural weapons it needs to successfully
investigate and prosecute public corruption. Unless remedied, this
deficiency will continue to blunt the ameliorative effect of all other
enforcement-enhancing reforms.
Through many of its provisions, the UNCAC acknowledges
this crucial deficit. With respect to enforcement, the convention
not only directs state parties to adopt legislation establishing
corruption crimes—the focus of the preexisting regional
conventions—but also recommends the implementation of
important anti-corruption law enforcement tools and techniques.28
27 See ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, Effective
Prosecution of Corruption: Report on the Master Training Seminar, Doc. 100403 (2003),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/41/35023374.pdf (finding various
impediments to successful anti-corruption reform by analyzing several case
studies of failed reforms).
28 These anti-corruption law enforcement tools include: (1) anti-money
laundering laws, United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 14, Dec. 11,
2003, 43 I.L.M. 37 [hereinafter UNCAC]; (2) witness protection measures, id. arts.
25(a), 32; (3) whistleblower protection laws, id. art. 33; (4) laws authorizing
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Many international organizations, developed nations, and NGOs
offer ongoing assistance and monitoring to support
implementation of the UNCAC’s many reforms.29 To date,
however, implementation of the convention’s provisions is
spotty.30 The convention’s directives and the recommendations in
its lengthy legislative guide,31 while appropriate, are thin on
context and rationale, and largely stated generally and
provisionally. No monitoring mechanism yet exists.
Additionally, and particularly with respect to the enforcement
objective, the tools and techniques most crucial to building a
credible and sustainable prosecutorial capacity are scattered
throughout the UNCAC’s eight chapters and seventy-one articles,
a presentation that fails to highlight the potentially powerful and
immediate impact of a handful of law enforcement reforms. If
those with the power to sway the legislature and those in law
enforcement who could most use them fail to appreciate these key
law enforcement tools, these crucial procedural reforms will likely
get lost in the long process of pushing for comprehensive reform,
or will be enacted in partial or piecemeal fashion, thereby diluting
their potency as a unit. Thus, the next step in aid of the anticorruption enforcement effort is a concise legislative package
drawn from the on-the-ground experiences of nations facing anticorruption enforcement challenges similar to those currently faced
by many developing countries. If understood and implemented as
a coherent system of interrelated parts, such a package of reforms
could lay the groundwork for effective anti-corruption

undercover operations and the admission into evidence of undercover tapes, id.
art. 50(1); (5) laws authorizing timely access to bank account records and other
financial data, id. art. 40; and (6) immunity and cooperation mechanisms, id. art.
37.
29 The United Nations has established a Global Programme Against
Corruption to assist in implementation of the UNCAC. See U.N. Office on Drugs
& Crime, UNODC and Corruption, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en
/corruption/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
30 Abid Aslam, Corruption: World Bank, U.N. Target Kleptocrats, INTER PRESS
SERV., Sept. 17, 2007, available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39291 (“As
with many international pacts, the corruption convention has not been high
among many parliaments’ priorities.”).
31 See U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime [UNODC], Div. of Treaty Aff., Legislative
Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
U.N. Sales No. E.06.IV.16 (2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf
/corruption/CoC_LegislativeGuide.pdf.
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enforcement both in the short term and over the long haul as other
reinforcing institutional reforms take hold.
2.2. The Problem of Entrenched Public Corruption in Indonesia:
History, Reformasi, and the Challenges to Building a Competent,
Credible Enforcement Capability
“It is difficult to overstate the seriousness of the problem of
corruption in Indonesia,” begins a report assessing the status and
success of anti-corruption initiatives implemented in Indonesia
during recent years.32 Corruption is deeply embedded in the fabric
of society and institutions. And, typically, it is highly organized.
Corruption appears to be endemic in the bureaucracy, in State
Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”) and in government-business
intercourse. It is also a serious problem in the police, Attorney
General’s Office (“AGO”) and judiciary.
“Political parties,
parliamentarians, civil society groups and the media are not
immune either.”33
Corruption occurs in local, day-to-day transactions, as teachers
exact bribes for children’s report cards, principals pocket
exorbitant “registration fees,” petty bureaucrats require cash to
remove the hurdles on the path to a “free” government ID card,
traffic stops for non-existent violations result in release after
payment of a “peace offering,” and securing a civil service post
depends on a sufficient monetary “show of appreciation” to those
processing the application.34 Corruption pervades the nation’s tax
DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
Id.; see also Transparency Int’l, Pol’y & Res. Dep’t., Report on the
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007, at 22 tbl.4.2 (Dec. 6,
2007), available at http://www.transparency.org/content/download/27256
/410704/file/GCB_2007_report_en_02-12-2007.pdf
(reporting
Indonesian
perceptions that the police are the most corrupt of 14 sectors in society, followed
closely by the legal system/judiciary and the legislature). A survey of over 1800
businesses in Indonesia, carried out in 2001–2002, showed that over 75% of the
firms reported paying bribes to local officials. J. Vernon Henderson & Ari
Kuncoro, Corruption in Indonesia 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 10674, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10674; see also
Suwardiman,’Kompas’ Polling: Soot in the Face of Law Enforcement Institutions,
KOMPAS, Mar. 17, 2008 (unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file with author)
(describing a poll on corruption by Kompas newspaper in which over 73% of
respondents believed that no government institution was free of corruption, and
an even higher percentage viewed law enforcement as tainted).
34 PARTNERSHIP FOR GOVERNANCE REFORM, THE POOR SPEAK UP: 17 STORIES OF
CORRUPTION 18, 59, 65, 84 (Ratih Hardjono & Stefanie Teggemann eds., 2002)
32
33
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system, with desk clerks pocketing cash in exchange for
“adjusting” the tax that must be paid,35 and occurs on a grand
scale, as layers of government bureaucrats skim government and
donor funding of public works projects. The country’s anticorruption agency recently estimated that corruption in
government procurement contracts alone costs the Indonesian
government a whopping $4 billion a year.36
Indonesia’s recent history contributes to corruption’s
stranglehold on the country. A sprawling archipelago in South
East Asia, Indonesia is a nation of about 237 million people, the
fourth largest nation in the world, and the most populous Muslimmajority state.37 It is a vibrant country in which people of different
religions, ethnicities, and languages intermingle, and modern pop
cultural influences—western clothes, hip-hop music, and television
talk shows—coexist with more traditional garb and practices.
Serving at first as a base for the Dutch East India Company’s
lucrative spice trade, the Indonesian islands gradually came under
Dutch rule, which extended until Japan occupied them during
World War II. Indonesian nationalists led by Sukarno declared
independence in 1945, and achieved it after a four-year guerilla
war against the returning Dutch.
A fragile parliamentary
democracy crumbled in 1959. Under the rubric of “Guided
Democracy,” President Sukarno oversaw a tightly controlled
nation. In the mid-1960s, a military leader, Major General Suharto,
seized control after a bloody purge of Communist Party members
aligned with Sukarno.38 Suharto thereafter ruled as Indonesia’s
president from 1967 to 1998. His thirty-year “New Order” regime
saw major foreign investment and economic growth sustained
alongside massive and widespread corruption perfected and

(compiling firsthand accounts of corruption from impoverished Indonesian
citizens).
35 An Indonesian friend recounted that a desk clerk in the tax office told him,
when he sought a tax return form, that for a fee he could determine the tax he
would like to pay.
36 Irawaty Wardany, Procurement Bribery Costs RI ‘Rp 36t a Year’, JAKARTA
POST, Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/11/06
/procurement-bribery-costs-ri-039rp-36t-year039.html.
37 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs:
September 2008, Background Note: Indonesia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei
/bgn/2748.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). While 86% of Indonesia’s population
is Muslim, it is not an Islamic state. Id.
38 Like many Indonesians, Sukarno and Suharto went by only one name.
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entrenched from the Dutch colonial legacy.39 In fact, “hierarchical,
systemic corruption became one of the central features of the New
Order political economy.”40
Suharto centralized state authority, and ran the government
according to “an elaborate system of franchises.”41 He sold the
state’s policy-making role to cronies, who became rich operating
monopolies, fulfilling lavishly overpriced government contracts,
and avoiding taxes. Many foreign investors participated willingly
in the pay-to-play system, and Suharto’s openly corrupt Indonesia
was one of the “Asian paradox” examples used by those who
argued that authoritarian and corrupt government structure may
not impede, and, in fact, may often facilitate, economic growth.42
In turn, Indonesia’s financial collapse in 1997, more severe and
more sustained than in other Asian economies, revealed the longterm toll of Suharto’s crony capitalism.43 In 1998, Suharto resigned
in the wake of violent student demonstrations, and a fitful process
of reform and multi-party democratization began. Suharto left
office with millions of dollars in assets. In 2007, the Attorney
General’s Office brought a civil suit against Suharto in an effort to
recover over $400 million in state assets.44
39 World Bank, E. Asia Poverty Reduction & Econ. Mgmt. Unit, Combating
Corruption in Indonesia: Enhancing Accountability for Development, at 6 (Oct. 20, 2003)
(“From this [colonial] period, Indonesia inherited such practices as paying for
positions in government, expecting employees to cover all non-salary costs from
their salaries, and a general blurring of lines between public and private
resources.”); see also Dwight Y. King, Corruption in Indonesia: A Curable Cancer?, 53
J. INT’L AFF. 603 (2000) (charting the history of corruption in Indonesia from the
tenth century through Suharto’s “New Order”).
40 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 9; see also THEODORE FRIEND, INDONESIAN
DESTINIES 250–53 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003) (describing how Suharto created
“foundations” imposing mandatory donations on taxpayers, from which billions
were channeled to himself and his family).
41 World Bank, supra note 39, at 6; see also Jared Levinson, Indonesia’s Odyssey:
A Nation’s Long, Perilous Journey to the Rule of Law and Democracy, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 103, 112 (2001) (“Suharto centralized all power in Jakarta with himself as
the supreme leader.”).
42 World Bank, supra note 39, at 7–8 (summarizing arguments of Goodpaster,
McLeod, and McIntyre).
43 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Anti-Corruption Policy Making in
Practice: What Can Be Learned for Implementing Article 5 of UNCAC? 87–88 (Karen
Hussman ed., 2007), available at http://www.u4.no/themes/uncac/report.cfm
[hereinafter U4 Report].
44 Peter Gelling, Indonesian Prosecutors File Civil Suit Against Suharto for $441
Million, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 9, 2007, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php
?id=6570502; Soeharto Stole Millions from Charity: Witness, VOICE OF INDONESIA,

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/3

2008]

LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDONESIA

199

Suharto left behind not only the remnants of economic and
environmental plunder, but also government structures, a business
community, and civil society accustomed to what Indonesians refer
to by the acronym KKN—corruption, collusion and nepotism—as
an everyday fact of life. Since the fall of Suharto, a raucous and
energetic media and a spate of new civil society organizations has
kept the spotlight on public corruption and helped ensure that
fighting corruption remains a high-profile political issue for
candidates competing for votes.45 In the period of reform, or
Reformasi, since Suharto’s departure, Indonesia has had four
presidents, all of whom have—under international pressure and
with substantial international, private business, and NGO
assistance—undertaken efforts to address the rampant corruption.
Each has put forth law enforcement as a centerpiece of the
campaign—a crucial part of the “shock therapy,” which, according
to the current president, the country needs to eradicate corruption
both structurally and culturally.46
But transforming the aspiration of clean, effective anticorruption law enforcement into a reality in an environment of
entrenched corruption like Indonesia’s is a formidable
undertaking.
As in many other developing countries, a
fundamental problem with relying upon the criminal justice
system as an instigator of corruption reform is that corruption runs
through the very institutions with law enforcement responsibility:
the National Police,47 the Attorney General’s Office, and the
judiciary, including the Supreme Court.48 Observers claim that
Nov. 21, 2007, http://www.voi.co.id/news/9/tahun/2007/bulan/11/tanggal
/21/id/586; see also ROBIN HODESS, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL
CORRUPTION REPORT 2004, 13 tbl.1.1 (2004), available at http://www.transparency
.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2004#download
(listing
recent corrupt leaders and estimated amounts of embezzled funds).
45 U4 Report, supra note 43, at 95–96, 102–103; Media Reports Help Uncover
Corruption Cases: KPK Chief, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 23, 2008, http://kbribeirut.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=80.
46 “We Need Shock Therapy,” TIME, Nov. 1, 2004, http://www.time.com
/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501041108-749480,00.html; see also U4 Report,
supra note 43, at 91–92 (describing the history of anti-corruption initiatives in postSuharto Indonesia).
47 World Bank, supra note 39, at 84–86; Reh Atemalem, Survey: Police Most
Corrupt Institution in Indonesia, TEMPO, Dec. 7, 2007 (on file with author).
48 World Bank, supra note 39, at 88–90; SEBASTIAN POMPE, THE INDONESIAN
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE 416 (2005) (“It is currently
common knowledge that the Supreme Court is affected by corruption, and judges
in private conversation have referred to it for many years as a routine matter.”);
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investigation results,49 prosecution decisions,50 and court verdicts51
have been bought.

see also Atemalem, supra note 47; U4 Report, supra note 43, at 89; Abdul Khalik,
Corrupt Legal Institutions Impede Graft Reforms: NGOs, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 29, 2008,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/01/28/corrupt-legal-institutionsimpede-graft-reforms-ngos.html; Andreas D. Arditya, Court Chief Suspended for
‘Mischievous’ Conduct, JAKARTA POST, July 12, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost
.com/node/174576.
49 Saldi Isra, Getting Rid of Corruption in Indonesia: The Future, JAKARTA POST,
Dec. 31, 2004, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/12/31/getting-ridcorruption-indonesia-future.html (noting that “[i]t is widely believed that the
issuance of an SP3 [Letter for the Termination of an Investigation] often depends
on a bribe.”).
50 Indonesian A-G Signals Crackdown on Corrupt Prosecutors, ABC NEWS
ONLINE, May 14, 2007, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/05/14
/1922751.htm (“Indonesia’s new Attorney-General has admitted four out of five
prosecutors in Indonesia are open to corruption but says he will root out the
wrongdoers.”); see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS [PWC] & BRIT. INST. OF INT’L &
COMP. LAW [BIICL], FOCUS ON PEOPLE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNANCE
AUDIT OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 38-40
(July 2001) [hereinafter PWC & BIICL REPORT]. In March 2008, shortly after the
Attorney General’s Office announced that it was terminating a major
investigation, the lead prosecutor in the matter was arrested in Jakarta by the
Corruption Eradication Commission as he accepted a payment of over $600,000.
See generally Prosecutor Held for Alleged Bribery, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 4, 2008,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/03/03/prosecutor-held-allegedbribery.html; Lilian Budianto, Question of Integrity for Prosecutors, JAKARTA POST,
Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/03/06/questionintegrity-prosecutors.html; Bribery Case Puts AGO Officals [sic] in the Spotlight,
JAKARTA POST, June 13, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/13
/bribery-case-puts-ago-officals-spotlight.html. The prosecutor was subsequently
convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Irawaty Wardany, Disgraced Urip
Gets 20 Years, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 5, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news
/2008/09/05/disgraced-urip-gets-20-years.html.
51 An assessment of justice sector integrity in two Indonesian provinces,
conducted by the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, found that high percentages of
lawyers, prisoners, court users and business people were aware of instances in
which bribes had been paid to judges, prosecutors, police and court staff.
UNODC, Assessment of Justice Sector Integrity and Capacity in Two Indonesian
Provinces: Technical Assessment Report, 27–37 (Mar. 2006) available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publications_indonesia_e_assessment.p
df) (reporting statistics indicating a perception of corruption); see also Adrian
Verity, Skewed Justice in Indonesia’s Tainted Courts, ASIA SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 2006,
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=9
7&Itemid=31 (“[A]ccording to Asep Rahmat Fajar, head of the Indonesian Judicial
Monitoring Society . . . ‘buying court verdicts has been a systematic and organized
crime in the country’s legal system. It involves people from the highest levels,
such as high court judges, down to the lowest levels, such as administrative staff
in the Supreme Court.”). See also Levinson, supra note 41, at 114–15 (describing
some of the corruption in Indonesia’s legal system).
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The structures and traditions of the investigatory and
prosecutorial services do not facilitate effective anti-corruption
enforcement. Both the police and the prosecution service in
Indonesia are managed through a highly centralized, hierarchical
chain of command.52 In the AGO, which includes Indonesia’s
prosecution service,53 the effect of this top-down management
system is that most serious measures require multiple levels and
review and approval,54 reducing the ability of prosecutors to act
quickly or innovate. This institutional rigidity reinforces the
inherited Dutch civil law tradition that accords little discretion to
prosecutors to follow the evidence to find new crimes and
suspects. Concern that prosecutors in Indonesia might misuse
greater discretion for corrupt purposes, however, means that
internal reforms, at least in the short term, are not likely to focus on
changing this aspect of how prosecutors function.
Additionally, laws adopted during the Suharto era explicitly
separated the investigatory and prosecutorial functions between
the National Police and the AGO, so that prosecutors cannot
oversee investigations by the police, and the Attorney General has
a limited ability to establish policy that binds investigators outside
his office.55 Under the procedure code, the police may obtain
52 See PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 30–31 (describing the history of
Indonesia’s hierarchical system); World Bank, supra note 39, at 86–87 (noting the
“excessive hierarchical layers” of which there are seven). The police and
prosecution service were militarized during the Suharto era. Although both were
separated from the armed forces after the fall of Suharto, vestiges remain.
Prosecutors wear uniforms and salute their superiors.
53 In Indonesia, as in many civil law countries, the prosecution service is part
of the Attorney General’s Office, and is separate from the Ministry of Law, which
is under the direction of the Minister of Law and is responsible for drafting
legislation, developing legal policy, and overseeing various functions including
prisons and the customs service.
54 PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 30–31; World Bank, supra note 39, at
87.
55 At the time, the compartmentalization was viewed as a reform which
created checks and balances and avoided excessive concentration of criminal
enforcement powers. PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 27–29. Now, with
prosecutors widely regarded as having operated as instruments of an
authoritarian government, and with rampant corruption within the prosecution
service openly acknowledged, the notion that prosecutors should have greater
discretion in charging and resolving cases to enhance the anti-corruption effort is
viewed with skepticism. Indeed, the 2002 law which created the Corruption
Eradication Commission and gave it prosecutorial authority in corruption cases
specifically divested the agency of the authority to terminate an investigation or a
prosecution once one had been initiated. Law Number 30 of 2002 on the
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warrants to search, seize, and arrest without the necessity of
contact with prosecutors, and may question witnesses and take
other investigative actions.56 Once an investigation is complete,
both the investigative file and responsibility for custody of the
suspect passes to the prosecution, and police generally have no
further role in the process.57 The lack of close coordination
between the police and the AGO, and the turf jealousies that arise
from the compartmentalization of their functions, impede effective
preparation and presentation of cases across the entire spectrum of
law enforcement, and create particular problems in the corruption
area, where the separation of functions makes it nearly impossible
for prosecutors to employ the highly effective strategy of pursuing
a series of investigations simultaneously to dismantle a network of
corruptors.58 Some greater investigatory authority exists, and
some investigators are employed, within the AGO’s Special Crimes
division, which handles public corruption cases. The division of
the AGO into the Special Crimes and General Crimes departments,
with different and potentially overlapping jurisdictions, however,
presents enforcement impediments of its own. 59 The dispersal of
prosecutorial jurisdiction means that prosecutions of public
corruption in Indonesia are rarely combined with prosecutions of
related crimes, such as tax and customs offenses, illegal logging,
and money laundering, which in turn means that law enforcement
forfeits the opportunity to bring multiple criminal charges to bear
Commission to Eradicate Criminal Acts of Corruption (Indon.). While these
concerns are legitimate, in the longer term only more discretion, not less, will
transform Indonesian prosecutors into effective instruments against corruption.
This concept is gaining ground in the country; a draft of a new criminal procedure
code includes some provisions which strengthen prosecutorial discretion. See
generally Robert Strang, “More Adversarial But Not Completely Adversarial”:
Reformasi of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
(forthcoming 2008).
56 Law Number 8 of 1981 Concerning the Law of Criminal Procedure, arts.
16–24, 32–49, & 106–33 (Indon.) (setting forth the rules for arrest, search, seizure,
and investigation).
57 Id. arts. 25, 137–44 (detailing rules for prosecution).
58 PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 28–29. Our own discussions with
Indonesian prosecutors indicated that they usually had little knowledge of
corruption investigations prior to a completed dossier being delivered by the
police, and that the prosecutors were often dissatisfied with steps that had been
taken during the investigative stage.
59 The Special Crimes division handles the prosecution of public corruption
and human rights crimes, while the General Crimes division handles all other
criminal prosecutions. PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 33–35.
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on corruption defendants.
Since the fall of Suharto, various efforts have been and are
being made to address these problems of institutional corruption
and structure. Anti-corruption legislation was passed in 1999,60
2001,61 and again in 2002.62 In line with other nations facing deeply
entrenched corruption and with the directives of numerous anticorruption conventions,63 the latter statute created the Corruption
Eradication Commission, or KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi),
an independent corruption-fighting agency equipped with its own
investigators and prosecutors, authority to independently
investigate and prosecute major corruption cases, and a new AntiCorruption Court to hear its cases.64 These structures together
establish a route for public corruption investigations and
prosecutions to circumvent the existing criminal justice
apparatus.65 Although their jurisdictions overlap, the KPK has the
authority to take over investigations or prosecutions from the
police or AGO if there is delay, bias, obstructive influence asserted
by another government branch, or other circumstances indicating
the police or AGO are not handling the case responsibly.66
The KPK’s responsibilities extend well beyond criminal
enforcement, but its prosecutions have been most visible. Its
60 Law Number 28 of 1999 on on a Corruption-free State Administration
(Indon.); Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offenses (Indon.).
61 Law Number 20 of 2001, Amendment to Law Number 31 of 1999 on
Eradication of Corruption Offenses (Indon.).
62 Law Number 30 of 2002 on the Commission for the Eradication of Criminal
Acts of Corruption (Indon.).
63 E.g., UNCAC, supra note 28, art. 6 (directing parties to establish
preventative anti-corruption bodies). Singapore, Hong Kong, Botswana, and
other countries have long had independent anti-corruption agencies. Other
countries have formed similar units in recent years. See U.N. Dev. Programme,
Democratic Governance Practice Team, Institutional Arrangements to Combat
Corruption:
A
Comparative
Study,
3–10
(2005),
available
at
http://regionalcentrebangkok.undp.or.th/practices/governance/documents/Co
rruption_Comparative_Study-200512.pdf (comparing the anti-corruption efforts
of other southeast Asian countries).
64 Law Number 30 of 2002, Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts
of Corruption, arts. 53–62 (Indon.).
65 The preamble to the 2002 law which created the KPK specifically observes
that existing government agencies had not been effective in handling corruption
cases, and the law itself states that the KPK is to operate “independently, free
from any and all influence,” with the “primary purpose of improving the
effectiveness and efficiency of efforts to eradicate criminal acts of corruption.” Id.
pmbl, arts. 3–4.
66 Id. arts. 8–10, 42, 68.
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leadership, five commissioners selected by the legislature from a
list submitted by the president, sees investigations and
prosecutions as “the cutting edge for implementing broader
institutional reforms . . . .”67
The KPK served notice early on that attacking corruption in
law enforcement and the judiciary was a priority,68 and the agency
has posted a number of prosecutorial accomplishments during its
first several years of operation.69 Still, criticism of the agency’s
67 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 48; see also U4 Report, supra note 43, at 92
(noting that while the KPK has a mandate to implement preventive measures, “at
the moment the emphasis of KPK is more focused on investigation and
prosecution.”).
68 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 48. The KPK arrested five clerks at the
Supreme Court and charged them with extorting defendants. The investigation
led to the execution of a search warrant in the chambers of the Chief Justice
himself, although the KPK was not able to prove that the Chief Justice was part of
the extortion activity. Muninggar Sri Saraswati, Antigraft Team Raids Supreme
Court, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 28, 2005, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news
/2005/10/28/antigraft-team-raids-supreme-court.html; New Judges to Hear Probo
Case, JAKARTA POST, Nov. 5, 2005, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/11
/05/new-judges-hear-probo-case.html.
69 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 53–54 (crediting the KPK with “[i]nitiating
a growing number of investigations and prosecutions . . . (which resulted in the
convictions of former Aceh Governor Puteh and members of the KPK”); see also
Tim Lankester, Reform of Indonesia’s Governance: Myth or Reality?, STRAITS TIMES,
Apr. 9, 2007, http://www.ytlcommunity.com/commnews/shownews.asp
?newsid=28804 (“The [KPK] has held hundreds of investigations and prosecuted
former ministers, business leaders, judges, governors and legislators.”).
There has been steady growth in the number of corruption cases brought by
the KPK. In 2004, the year the Court came into existence, one single case was
filed. Sixteen new cases were filed in 2005, and 25 new cases were filed in 2006.
ANTI-CORRUPTION COURT, CENT. JAKARTA DIST. COURT, ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2006);
see also KPK, ANNUAL REPORT 2006, 4.5–4.12 (2006), available at
http://www.kpk.go.id/modules/wmpdownloads/files/Annual_Report_2006_4.
pdf. [hereinafter KPK ANNUAL REPORT] (noting an increase in the court’s
caseload). Notable recent cases have included the convictions of a former national
police chief, and the arrests of the governor of the central bank and several
members of the national legislature. See, e.g., Andra Wisnu & Andreas D. Arditya,
DPR Warns KPK over Targeting Lawmakers, JAKARTA POST, July 4, 2008,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/07/04/dpr-warns-kpk-overtargeting-lawmakers.html; Andreas D. Arditya, Lawmaker Admits Receiving Bribes,
JAKARTA POST, July 16, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/07/16
/lawmaker-admits-receiving-bribes.html; Ex-Police Chief Sentenced for Graft,
JAKARTA POST, June 12, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/12
/expolice-chief-sentenced-graft.html; Graft Body Finally Detains BI Chief, JAKARTA
POST, Apr. 11, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/04/11/graftbody-finally-detains-bi-chief.html; KPK Arrests Lawmaker for Alleged Bribery,
JAKARTA POST, Apr. 10, 2008, http://old.thejakartapost.com/detailweekly.asp
?fileid=20080410.@01.
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efforts include perceived failures to set its sights up the hierarchy
to capture “big fish” corruptors70 and to reach out of the capital
and into the nation’s many widespread provinces where
corruption flourishes after the decentralization that occurred postSuharto.71
A more recent complaint is that the agency’s
investigations have the appearance of political targeting in the
lead-up to the 2009 elections.72 In December 2007, a new board of
five KPK Commissioners was selected following the end of the
statutory four-year term of the initial team.73
Other efforts to step up the battle against corruption, both in
terms of short-term prosecutions and long-term institutional
reform, gained significant momentum after the election of
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in October 2004.

70 Abdul Khalik, KPK Accused of Half-Hearted Fight, JAKARTA POST, May 5,
2008,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/05/05/kpk-accusedhalfhearted-fight.html; see also Suharto Scion’s Channel Islands Treasure Hunt, ASIA
SENTINEL, Mar. 12, 2007, http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com
_content&task=view&id=417&Itemid=31 (“[C]ritics say the only big fish that have
been netted and delivered all the way to the dock so far are those connected to his
political opponents . . . .”).
71 See DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 35 (“SBY’s shock therapy on
corruption . . . is only happening in Jakarta.”) (quoting Ervyn Kaffah, National
Coalition of NGOs Against Corruption).
72 See Politics Still a Factor in Graft Probes, Say Observers, JAKARTA POST, Nov.
17,
2007,
http://www.suedostasienportal.de/thread.php?postid=27853&sid
=aa81ea871b7d35b7a91e58290d723202#post2785 (noting that critics state “political
power still comes into play” in the KPK’s corruption enforcement); see also Bill
Guerin, Politics of Corruption in Indonesia, ASIA TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IC29Ae01.html
(noting
“[g]rowing opposition complaints of discriminatory justice” being aimed at the
KPK).
73 The KPK is run by a board of five commissioners, selected by the president
from a pool suggested by a selection committee. Law Number 30 of 2002,
Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption, arts. 21(1), 26(1),
30 (Indon.). They may serve a term of four years, with the possibility of being
reappointed to one additional term. Id. art. 34. The initial board was appointed in
late 2003, and the candidates for the new board were submitted in late 2007. Desy
Nurhayati, Review KPK Candidates: NGOs, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 3, 2007,
http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071003.H05; see also
Azhar Vows to Fight Graft, THE POINT, Dec. 19, 2007 (on file with author); No
‘Angels’, Ten Names of Corruption Eradication Commission Head Candidates Have Been
Submitted to the President, TEMPO, Sept. 18–24, 2007, http://fcppindonesia.org/eng/news_and_events/current_issues/no_angels; Peter Gelling,
Indonesian Corruption Fighters under Question, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 28, 2007,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/28/asia/indo.php
(noting
the
appointment of new KPK commissioners).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

206

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 30:1

Yudhoyono campaigned on an anti-corruption platform.74 His
government’s approach to the formidable task of fighting
entrenched corruption has been both comprehensive and
incremental. Measures implemented address multiple aspects of
corruption reform, including prevention, state-building, and civil
society education. The “most noticeable thrust,” however, “has
been in the realm of prosecutions.”75 A 2005 presidential order
created a Coordinating Team for the Eradication of Criminal
Corrupt Acts (known by its Indonesian acronym as Timtas Tipikor),
a temporary interdepartmental anti-corruption task force that
brought together police investigators, auditors, and prosecutors
from the AGO to develop and prosecute corruption cases against
government officials.76 Although now disbanded, during its two
years of existence it successfully prosecuted the former Minister of
Religious Affairs, a judge, and others for public corruption.77
Within the AGO, prosecutions of corruption cases have increased,78
and the formation of an elite anti-corruption team was recently
announced.79 A recent report by a foreign donors’ organization
74 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 17 (discussing the significant problems
that follow from running (and winning) on an anti-corruption platform) .
75 Id. at 2.
76 Presidential Decree Number 11 of 2005 (Indon.); Eva C. Komandjaja &
Muninggar Sri Saraswati, Antigraft Teams May Overlap, JAKARTA POST, May 7, 2005,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/05/07/antigraft-teams-mayoverlap.html.
77 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 20, app. 4; Ridwan Max Sijabat, Former
Religious Affairs Minister Faces Life in Jail, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 7, 2005,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/10/07/former-religious-affairsminister-faces-life-jail.html (describing prosecution of former minister); L.R.
Baskoro et al., The Sting at Chamoe-Chamoe, TEMPO, Jan. 17–23, 2005 (on file with
author) (chronicling the events of a government sting against a corrupt judge); M.
Taufiqurrahman, Govt Disbands Anti-graft Team, JAKARTA POST, June 12, 2007,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/06/12/govt-disbands-antigraftteam.html.
78 E.g., U4 Report, supra note 43, at 90 (noting that in 2006 prosecutors across
Indonesia were handling 265 corruption cases involving local legislators and 46
involving provincial or district heads, an “unprecedented phenomenon in
Indonesia”); see also Lankester, supra note 69 (“The special crimes case load of the
Attorney-General has increased by nearly six times over the past five years.”);
Scores of Officials Grilled, Tried for Graft, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 4, 2008,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/04/scores-officials-grilled-triedgraft.html (noting that almost 78 officials were being tried or investigated for
alleged corruption).
79 Special Team is Not Set up Because the District Attorney’s Office Lost a Step from
the Corruption Eradication Commission, KOMPAS, June 6, 2008 (unpublished U.S.
Embassy translation on file with author); see also U.S. Pledges to Help Eradicate
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observed that “[l]aw enforcement seems to have made some
impact in Indonesia. The punitive measures are sending a strong
message that corruption is not risk-free, and some Indonesian
commentators are claiming that these measures are changing the
way bureaucrats behave.”80 Many other watchdogs complain,
however, that the government remains hampered by official footdragging and corruption, 81 and that with respect to enforcement,
investigations still proceed too slowly82 and too many defendants
receive light sentences or walk free.83
Efforts to prevent corruption in the justice sector have been
somewhat less noteworthy,84 but some progress has been made in
reforming the existing criminal justice institutions. Oversight
commissions have been established for the judiciary, the police,
and the prosecution service to investigate complaints of corruption
and to pursue disciplinary actions.85 The current president’s
Corruption, JAKARTA POST, June 10, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com
/news/2008/06/10/us-pledges-help-eradicate-corruption.html (discussing the
U.S. pledge of support in the context of the newly created anti-corruption unit
within the AGO).
80 U4 Report, supra note 43, at 109.
81 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1–2 (“[T]here also are real political and
bureaucratic constraints on the pace and scope of reform. Because the president’s
cabinet is essentially a coalition government, his ability to push (or punish) his
Ministers and other senior officials is limited.”); see also Lankester, supra note 69
(“President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono would like to take action. But his hands
appear to be tied due to opposition from the Chief Justice (who recently extended
his own term until 2008) and from some leading members of his Cabinet. . . . [I]t
is disappointing that Parliament, instead of acting as a check on corruption, has
become part of the problem.”).
82 Desy Nurhayati, Graft Probes Are “Too Slow”, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 9, 2007,
http://old.thejakartapost.com/detailweekly.asp?fileid=20071009.@01 (noting that
corruption probes took on average two and a half years to complete and were
“too slow” during the first half of 2007).
83 Fabio Scarpello, Reversing Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Drive, ASIA TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IC06Ae01.html
(“According to ICW [Indonesia Corruption Watch], of the 125 corruption cases
heard last year at the Administrative Court, 40 of the defendants were released
without sanction, and of those convicted, most received light sentences.”); Verity,
supra note 51 (“ICW notes that 142 defendants were exonerated in 77 corruption
cases from 1999 to 2006.”).
84 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 6 (“The Yudhoyono government’s
emphasis on prosecution, commendable as it is, has not been matched to date by a
comparably vigorous effort to prevent corruption from occurring within the
bureaucracy. Until meaningful checks on corruption and collusion are introduced
into the civil service, the threat of punishment will have, at best, only a limited
deterrent effect.”).
85 Law Number 22 of 2004 Establishing Judicial Commission (Indon.);
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appointees as National Police Chief and Attorney General are
generally viewed as improvements over appointees from prior
administrations.86 Reforms are underway in both the Indonesian
National Police and the AGO, and in both agencies a process of
incremental change has resulted in the weeding out of a number of
dishonest officials.87 The Partnership for Governance Reform, an
Presidential Decree Number 17 of 2005 Establishing Police Commission (Indon.);
Presidential Decree Number 18 of 2005 Establishing Prosecution Commission
(Indon.); Judicial Commission Hears Call for More Aggressive Action, JAKARTA POST,
Nov.
30,
2007,
http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid
=20071130.D11; Corruption Body Busts Judicial Commission Member, JAKARTA POST,
Sept.
27,
2007,
http://old.thejakartapost.com/detailweekly.asp?fileid
=20070927.@05 (proving that even those charged with rooting out corruption may
themselves be tainted, a Judicial Commission member was arrested by the KPK in
connection with a procurement kickback scheme); Prosecutors Demand 6 Years for
Irawady in Graft Trial, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 23, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost
.com/news/2008/02/22/prosecutors-demand-6-years-irawady-graft-trial.html.
86 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 20; Budi Setyarso et al., Sutanto’s Promises,
TEMPO, Aug. 29–Sept. 4, 2006 (on file with author) (reviewing National Police
Chief Sutanto’s reforms in his first year). An expert on Indonesia recently wrote
that Yudhoyono’s appointment of “a strong reformist Attorney-General,
Hendarman Supandji, probably strengthens the counter-corruption fight, lending
credibility to SBY’s popular counter-corruption campaign.” Douglas E. Ramage,
A Reformed Indonesia, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Oct. 12, 2007, at 1.
87 See AGO Told to Get Tough on Crooked Prosecutors, JAKARTA POST, July 24,
2006, http://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/southeastasia/indonesia/netnews
/2006/ind27v10.htm; Ramage, supra note 86, at 9 (discussing reform efforts in the
police and customs service, and noting that public perceptions of the police have
been improving in recent years); Robert La Mont, The AGO’s Fight Against
Corruption, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 14, 2007, http://www.ppatk.go.id/berita.php
?nid=2634 (discussing internal reforms being carried out by Attorney General
Supandji).
The arrest of a senior prosecutor by the KPK on bribery charges in early
March 2008 substantially increased pressure on Supandji to take action against
corrupt prosecutors. Abdul Khalik, Rid AGO of Corrupt Officials: MPs, JAKARTA
POST, June 17, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/17/rid-agocorrupt-officials-mps.html; Adianto P. Simamora, Kalla Wants Tough Action
Against AGO Corruption, JAKARTA POST, June 14, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost
.com/news/2008/06/14/kalla-wants-tough-action-against-ago-corruption.html;
Adianto P. Simamora, VP Rejects Calls to Dismiss Hendarman, JAKARTA POST, June
21, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/21/vp-rejects-callsdismiss-hendarman.html. In response, Supandji pledged full cooperation with
the KPK, made administrative changes, opened his own internal investigation,
and pledged that “[t]here’s no forgiveness . . . for anyone involved.” Attorney’s
Arrest
a
Blow
for
Hendarman,
JAKARTA POST,
Mar.
4,
2008,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/03/03/attorney039s-arrest-a-blowhendarman.html; Dewi Indriastuti, Reorganizing the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the
Homework is Not Yet Finished, KOMPAS, June 4, 2008 (unpublished U.S. Embassy
translation on file with author); AGO Begins Investigation of Top Prosecutors,
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Indonesian NGO funded by the UNDP, has been assisting the
Attorney General and others in the justice sector with institutional
reforms,88 and several agencies, including USAID, AusAID, the
U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the U.S. Justice
Department’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development
Assistance and Training, are sponsoring multi-year projects, which
include supporting institutional reform in the AGO and the
courts.89
Yudhoyono is viewed as personally clean, and most see him as
trying to do the right thing, but hampered by holdovers from the
Suharto regime in Parliament, in the judiciary, and within his own
Surveys conducted by Transparency
administration.90
International show improvement from 2006 to 2007 in how
Indonesians rate their government’s effectiveness in fighting
corruption.91 Nevertheless, many Indonesians are increasingly
JAKARTA POST, June 18, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/18
/ago-begins-investigation-top-prosecutors.html; Dian Kuswandini, Hendarman
Admits AGO is in ‘Crisis of Credibility’, JAKARTA POST, July 23, 2008,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/node/175580; Wardany, supra note 50.
88 The Partnership was active in assisting the AGO in compiling the Agenda
of Attorney General’s Office Reform (2005), a booklet outlining areas for study
and internal reform with the assistance of donors. The Partnership for
Governance Reform, http://kemitraan.or.id (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
89 See
USAID/Indonesia:
Democracy
and
Governance,
http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/Program.3a.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2008)
(describing the Justice Sector Reform program); Indonesia Australia Legal
Development Facility, http://www.indo.ausaid.gov.au/projects/legaldevprg
.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (providing a generic overview of the Indonesia
Australia Legal Development Facility) ; Millenium Challenge Corporation [MCC],
Indonesia, http://www.mcc.gov/countries/indonesia/index.php (last visited
Oct. 20, 2008) (describing the MCC’s two-year, $55 million program of assistance);
Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance
and Training, DOJ/OPDAT Asia Pacific Programs, http://www.usdoj.gov
/criminal/opdat/asia-pacific/asia-pacific-prgs.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008)
(describing OPDAT programs in Indonesia).
90 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 (“President Yudhoyono is committed to
punishing corruption, and there is a small but significant constellation of reformminded actors inside and outside the government who have the potential to make
a difference.”); Abdul Khalik, Soeharto Loyalists ‘Thwart War on Graft’, JAKARTA
POST, Jan. 25, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/01/24/soeharto
-loyalists-thwart-war-graft039.html (reporting on issues leading up to the
conference of State Parties to the UNCAC); see generally Lankester, supra note 69.
91 Compare Transparency Int’l, Pol’y & Res. Dept., Report on the Transparency
International Global Corruption Barometer 2006, at 19 tbl.5 (2006), available at
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/12169/115654/version/1/file
/Global_Corruption_Barometer_2006_Report.pdf (indicating for 2006 that only
29% of Indonesians rated their government’s efforts to fight corruption as
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critical of the Yudhoyono administration’s record in eradicating
corruption after over three years in office, and are questioning its
commitment to take the steps needed to generate results matching
his anti-corruption rhetoric.92
Indonesia’s anti-corruption
campaign is thus at a crucial crossroads, with the efficacy and
integrity of corruption prosecutions at its center. Demonstrating
success in detecting and prosecuting corruption crimes will be
necessary to stave off apathy and cynicism and maintain the
political will and patience necessary to sustain more long-term
changes.
A police corps, prosecutor’s office, and judiciary reasonably
free from corruption are prerequisites for obtaining criminal
convictions that can gain public respect, and in Indonesia these
things will be a challenge to achieve. But even clean and efficient
law enforcement institutions cannot make headway against
entrenched public corruption without the appropriate legal tools in
their arsenals to investigate and prosecute those crimes. There
have been legal reforms implemented in the post-Suharto era, but
with respect to law enforcement, these efforts have been directed
primarily at creating the KPK and amending the criminal code to
create substantive corruption crimes. The Indonesian penal code,
inherited from the Dutch, already included several anti-corruption
provisions.93 Many more far-reaching anti-corruption laws were
enacted during the burst of legal reform following the fall of
Suharto. These include laws prohibiting bribery and bribe“effective” or “very effective”, while 50% rated those efforts as “not effective,”
and a further 18% reported that the government did not combat corruption at all
or actually encouraged it) with Transparency Int’l, supra note 33, at 24 tbl.4.4
(indicating that 37% of Indonesians rated their government’s efforts to fight
corruption as “effective”, while 47% rated those efforts “ineffective.”); see also
Abdul Khalik, Survey Sees Progress in Graft Fight, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 24, 2008,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/09/24/survey-sees-progress-graftfight.html (discussing the Transperency International report).
92 See, e.g., Dicky Christanto, Officials Using ‘Backroom Deals’ to Tackle
Corruption, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 26, 2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com
/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071226.M01; Government ‘Not Serious’ in Graft Fight,
JAKARTA POST, Dec. 27, 2007, http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp
?fileid=20071227.E04; SBY-JK Assessed to Have Failed in Eradicating Corruption,
KOMPAS, Dec. 28, 2007 (unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file with author);
2007 a ‘Gloomy Year’ for Corruption Fight, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 29, 2007,
http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071229.F01.
93 See, e,g., PENAL CODE, arts. 209 (bribery of public officials), 210 (bribery of
judges), 415 (embezzlement by public officials), 418 (public officials accepting
bribes), 419 (judges accepting bribes), 425 (extortion by public officials) (Indon.).
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taking,94 and creating rudimentary restitution and forfeiture
provisions and a corporate liability provision.95 A few substantive
criminal laws which are part of most modern, comprehensive
corruption-investigation legal regimes have successfully made
their way into the flurry of reform. These include provisions
establishing new obstruction of justice and false statement offenses
for corruption cases,96 and criminalizing the offenses that constitute
money laundering.97
However, far less legislative attention has been directed at
updating the supporting procedural apparatus that would allow
law enforcement to effectively investigate and prosecute the newly
added and revamped corruption crimes. The provisions of the
Indonesian criminal code and criminal procedure code fail in
numerous respects to provide anti-corruption law enforcement the
support it needs. Many provisions critical to discovering and
investigating the networks of corruption that permeate the
government bureaucracy, such as undercover operations, the
obtaining of bank records, and the use of immunity and sentence
reduction agreements in exchange for testimony, are missing
entirely.98
In fact, Indonesia’s narrow and rigid evidence rules
affirmatively impede effective anti-corruption investigation and
deter prosecutors from building a case on evidence derived
through modern techniques. Under the Indonesian procedure
code, only five types of evidence are considered legally valid
means of proof at trial.99 They are: (1) testimony of a witness; (2)
94 New offenses included unjust enrichment by public officials at the expense
of the state, and bribery of civil servants. Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication
of Corruption Offences, arts. 3, 13 (Indon.). For provisions increasing penalties,
see id. arts. 5–12.
95 Id. arts. 18, 20.
A 2001 amendment to the 1999 act elaborated and
expanded on the offenses created in the earlier law. See Law Number 20 of 2001,
Amendment to Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offenses
arts. 5 (bribing a civil servant), 6 (corruptly influencing a judge), 7 (government
procurement fraud), 8 (embezzlement by a civil servant), 9 (falsifying official
books and records), 10 (destruction of public records), 11 (gratuities to civil
servants), 12 (other corrupt acts by civil servants) (Indon.).
96 Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, arts. 21–22
(Indon.).
97
Law Number 15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as
amended by Law Number 25 of 2003 (Indon.).
98 See infra Section 4.
99 Prosecutors in Indonesia draft extremely detailed indictments which
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testimony of an expert; (3) a “document,” which is somewhat
narrowly defined to consist of public records, written testimony, or
other documents which have a connection to the contents of
another means of proof; (4) an “indication,” that is, testimony or
documentary evidence of an act that tends to establish that an
offense has occurred or the identity of the perpetrator; and (5)
testimony of the defendant.100 To secure a conviction, there must
be testimony from at least two witnesses or evidence in at least two
of the five categories of proof.101 Evidence that does not fit within
the parameters of the five statutorily defined types of legally
cognizable proof is nugatory, regardless of its relevance or
reliability.102 The rules do not expressly contemplate the admission
of undercover audio or video tapes, for example, or the admission
of electronic evidence, both of which may be crucial in corruption
prosecutions.103
summarize the police dossier that describes the investigation and the evidence
against the defendant. As in many civil law countries, the dossier plays a central
role in Indonesian criminal procedure since it is the primary basis on which the
judge, the key participant in the process, performs his inquisitorial function. See
Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of
Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 1, 14 (2004) (“In the inquisitorial system, a written dossier is the backbone of
the whole process and one of its main case-management tools, from the first stage
of the proceeding in which the police intervene, to the phase of appeals against
the verdict.”). Trials are held before panels of three judges. The head judge takes
the lead in examining the defendant and other witnesses. Indonesian Criminal
Procedure Code arts. 153, 159 & 163 (Indon.). Prosecutors may also examine, at
the discretion of the judge. Id. art. 164(2). The prosecution has the burden of
proof, and the judge is prohibited from making statements during the trial
indicating his view of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Id. arts. 66, 158.
Defendants have the right to counsel, the right to compel the attendance of
witnesses, and the right to a public trial, but there is no right equivalent to the
American right against self-incrimination. Id. arts. 64, 65, 69–74. Defendants,
therefore, nearly always testify at their trials.
100 Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code arts. 184, 185–189 (Indon.).
101 Id. art. 185(2)–(3).
102 Recognizing the inflexibility of this approach, a drafting committee of
legal experts is now working on draft revisions to the Criminal Procedure Code
which would, among other things, expand the scope of admissible evidence, and
define admissibility by reference to relevance rather than the narrow categories.
See generally Strang, supra note 55.
103 In a few recent laws relating to specific crimes, additional provisions have
been added which slightly broaden the scope of legal evidence. Electronic
communications evidence is admissible in money laundering cases, for example,
and the 2001 amendments to the 1999 corruption law also made electronic
communications evidence admissible in many corruption cases. See Law Number
15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as amended by Law

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/3

2008]

LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDONESIA

213

Because Indonesia follows the continental civil code system, in
which all legal authority flows from statutes, the opinion of one
court as to the proper interpretation of an evidence rule has no
utility as legal precedent and therefore is of limited predictive
value in assessing the position of other courts on the same
question. Thus, even with rulings as to admissibility in one trial,
prosecutors cannot be secure that they will be able to use the same
type of evidence in a subsequent trial before a different set of
judges. A recent decision by the Constitutional Court, which ruled
that the use of wiretaps by law enforcement must be specifically
regulated by law, reinforces this point.104
Without express
authorization to engage in a particular investigative technique, and
a basis to admit the resulting evidence through the narrow avenues
of the Indonesian procedure code, law enforcement is
understandably reluctant to use it, even if it would be the most
effective way to build a case. Instead, Indonesian investigators
continue to rely on suspect interrogation as their primary
evidence-gathering technique, which means that investigations are
historical and focused on the single target identified, rather than
penetrating into an ongoing corruption network, with the potential
to catch multiple perpetrators engaged in numerous criminal acts
over a period of time.
The UNCAC supports the notion that procedural reform is
critical to an effective law-enforcement regime, and the Indonesian
legislature has taken a few limited steps in that direction. The 2002
law which formed the KPK created a few new procedures and
conferred authority on the KPK to use some additional
investigative techniques,105 but the statutory provisions describing
Number 25 of 2003, art. 38(b) (Indon.) (permitting electronic evidence to be
admitted in money laundering cases); Law Number 20 of 2001 Concerning the
Law of Criminal Procedure, art. 26(A) (Indon.) (permitting electronic evidence to
serve as the basis of an “indication” under the Criminal Procedure Code). None
of those laws expressly authorize the admission of undercover audio or video
tapes.
104 Mulyana Wirakusumah et al. v. Indonesia, Constitutional Court Decision
No. 012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006 (Dec. 18, 2006) (Indon.) (ruling that the police
need express authorization for the use of undercover contacts, in which one party
to a conversation consents to police monitoring, and illustrating Indonesia’s strict
oversight of law enforcement).
105 See, e.g. Law Number 30 of 2002 of the Commission for the Eradication of
Criminal Acts of Corruption, art. 12 (Indon.) (granting authority to KPK to use
wiretaps, to ban persons from traveling abroad, to request financial and tax
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these procedures are not well-developed, leaving substantial
ambiguities as to what the KPK is authorized to do, and how it can
do it.106 Even more importantly, the law applies only to the 100 or
so investigators and prosecutors in the Jakarta-based KPK, and so
is of no assistance to the thousands of prosecutors with the AGO,
who will necessarily handle most of Indonesia’s corruption and
related prosecutions across the country’s vast expanse.107
It is not clear that forces pressing for broad anti-corruption
reform, or even those with the enforcement objective as a priority,
recognize how important it is to the overall corruption-reduction
goal to enact laws supporting the national law enforcement’s
evidence-gathering infrastructure.
Despite its centrality to
effective anti-corruption enforcement, criminal procedure is a
somewhat arcane subject, not well understood outside criminal
justice circles. Even within criminal justice institutions, because of
the many limitations of the current system, we found that
investigators and prosecutors in Indonesia have little experience
designing comprehensive investigatory strategies or implementing
numerous and complimentary evidence-gathering techniques in
records); id. art. 15 (obliging KPK to protect witnesses and whistleblowers).
106 As noted in the text, under the civil law system a decision by one judge
about the use by law enforcement of a particular statutory mechanism is of
limited predictive value concerning how other judges might treat the same
question. Ambiguity in the statute, therefore, can paralyze law enforcement, a
situation only rectified with new legislation. While the KPK has been successful
in recent cases in introducing intercepted conversations into evidence through its
wiretap authority, this authority does not extend to consensually monitored
(undercover) contacts, or to other investigative agencies.
107 The KPK is based in the capital city of Jakarta, and it has no physical
presence in the rest of the sprawling archipelago. At the end of 2006, the KPK had
fewer than 100 investigators and prosecutors. KPK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
69, at 3.6 (showing figures for employees in the “Repression Unit”). Moreover,
the KPK’s authority is specifically restricted to cases involving significant state
losses, law enforcement, or other high government officials, and cases which have
otherwise achieved widespread notoriety. Law Number 30 of 2002, Commission
for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption, art. 11 (Indon.). By contrast,
Indonesia’s prosecution service has at least 5600 prosecutors stationed in dozens
of offices around the country. See PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 49
(discussing the total number of public prosecution services throughout
Indonesia). Its mandate is not limited to large corruption cases, but can include
money laundering and other related crimes. Only the prosecution service, which
is represented in every province and has access to local witnesses and evidence,
can reach corruption by judges, governors, mayors, local legislators, police
officers, tax collectors, customs officials, and the petty but entrenched corruption
in various administrative bureaucracies across the republic which directly affects
the lives of Indonesian citizens.
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compiling a case, both of which are crucial to effectively
prosecuting a public corruption case. A recent report produced by
the KPK, which identified gaps between Indonesian law and the
UNCAC’s directives as a prelude to legislative reform, overlooks
several of the critical criminal procedure law deficiencies.108 This
pattern of neglecting legal reforms that enhance law enforcement’s
ability to actually investigate and prosecute corruption cases is
likely to be common in developing nations that most need reform.
3.

ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE ANTI-CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT

3.1. The Need for a Proactive Investigatory Strategy
Public corruption crimes pose unique evidence-gathering
challenges to law enforcement everywhere. Unlike many other
crimes, crimes of corruption are carried out in secret. The essence
of the crime is a covert deal struck by two satisfied parties who
have no incentive to report it, with no independent witnesses.109
Its means are outwardly unremarkable—typical dealings between
businesses or members of the public with individuals in their
official capacities, which become suspicious only when viewed
with a sophisticated eye as part of a scheme of corrupt activity.

108 The KPK’s 2006 report on the gaps in Indonesian law compared to the
UNCAC consists of a thoughtful 52-page report and an attached matrix. KPK GAP
ANALYSIS, supra note 7. While it discusses nearly every major article in the
UNCAC and the need for conforming Indonesian laws, the absence of any useful
discussion of either investigative techniques including undercover operations, as
called for in UNCAC art. 50(1), or immunity and sentence reduction mechanisms,
as called for in UNCAC art. 37, is surprising, since these are two of the most
critical law enforcement tools for investigating corruption. The omission is likely
attributable to the fact that the authors, a group of lawyers and consultants from
Indonesia and a governance think tank based in Switzerland, were all from civil
law countries which have little experience with such tools, and whom appear to
have had relatively little prosecutorial experience. Id. at Annex II. See also Basel
Institute on Governance, Homepage, http://www.baselgovernance.org (last
visited Oct. 20, 2008) (describing the form and function of the Basel Institute on
Governance, a Swiss non-profit think tank that worked on the KPK’s 2006 report).
109
See Tony KWOK Man-wai, Investigating Corruption, in United Nations
Asia & Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders
[UNAFEI], Annual Report for 2005 & Resource Material Series No. 69, at 191 (July
2006), available at http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms_all/no69.pdf
(listing difficulties of investigating corruption gleaned from the author’s
experience working within Hong Kong’s independent corruption commission).
Participants in corrupt networks are often linked by professional, ethnic or
regional ties of loyalty.
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The results—official influence or benefits indirectly delivered—are
not readily apparent. There is no crime scene to study, no victim to
interview, no fingerprints or trace evidence to examine. Financial
documents, which form a primary source of evidence, are often
protected by law or difficult to obtain, and require resources and
expertise to decipher. Witnesses are likely complicit or concerned
about retaliation from superiors if they file a report.110
Perpetrators, especially of high-level corruption, are often savvy
politicians, business people and financiers who understand how to
bury the evidence of their misdeeds, and have the connections and
means to call on other professionals—lawyers, accountants,
computer experts—to help execute the deed and launder the
proceeds.111 These criminals, with their hired help, can take
advantage of jurisdictional boundaries and identify loopholes that
hide their activities.112
They may be in a position to influence public opinion, threaten
the careers of investigators or prosecutors, interfere with the
investigation, or prolong the proceedings through various
tactics.113 All of these factors may drain the will of dedicated
investigators and prosecutors, and the public support on which
they depend.114
The primary investigative technique employed in many civil
law countries and across much of the developing world—long,
detailed interrogation of suspects—is often ineffective in meeting
the challenges that public corruption investigations present.
110 See Johnston & Doig, supra note 10, at 14 (“Organized corruption closes off
clients’ political or bureaucratic alternatives, giving the organization more corrupt
leverage” and “creates a network of operatives sharing not only rewards but also
risks; they thus have a stake in protecting corruption, increasing its proceeds, and
freezing out critics and holdout agents and clients.”).
111 See ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, supra note 27,
at 2 (“High-level corruption mobilizes extensive resources to camouflage ‘levies,’
‘commissions,’ and ‘kickbacks’ and to transfer the acquired assets to safe financial
havens.”).
112 Man-wai, supra note 109, at 191.
113 See, e.g., U.N. Dev. Programme Report, supra note 9, at 50–51 (describing
the belief of a former anti-corruption prosecutor in Fiji that political interference,
delay, and threats directed at prosecutors undermined a major corruption
prosecution).
114 ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, supra note 27, at
2–3 (“Rather than being able to conduct their investigations as they themselves see
fit, [law enforcement agencies which investigate high-level corruption cases] are
often obliged to follow orders from superiors who are close to the political power
structure and might try to influence the course of prosecution.”).
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Perpetrators alerted to an investigation proceeding by means of
interrogation usually have ample time to coordinate their stories
and to destroy or remove evidence. The essence of public
corruption is deceit, so lying to investigators is the norm, not the
exception. And without financial documents, recorded statements,
or other evidence with which to confront suspects, who are often
powerful individuals and well represented by counsel, prying
loose admissions is an uphill struggle. Interrogation oriented
toward discovering evidence of past acts is a poor tool to penetrate
a corrupt relationship, or web of relationships, which is usually
still vital at the time of the investigation. Effective investigation
and prosecution of corruption requires a more proactive evidencegathering strategy geared to the stealth, complexity, and ongoing,
interrelated nature of the crime.
An effective public corruption investigatory strategy has many
parallels to that employed in the investigation of organized crime.
First, rooting out corruption, like dismantling organized crime
syndicates, requires a strategy that penetrates the association of
criminals in order to gather information from the inside. It is the
secret agreement between the participants to engage in a certain
transaction or series of transactions, such as when an elected
official agrees to trade his vote for private financial gain, which
constitutes the crime. Evidence of the relationship between the
participants itself lays the foundation for the prosecution’s theory
of the crime, and evidence of communications between the
participants in the course of implementing the criminal scheme
supplies the direct proof of motive, intent, and implementation
that is often at the core of a public corruption case. Such
communications may be contemporaneous with the investigation,
and captured on audio or videotape with the help of an informant
or undercover investigator, or may be historical, as recounted from
the witness stand by a whistleblower or a participant who has
subsequently agreed to testify for the prosecution. In either
scenario, the standard approach is to start near the bottom of the
organization and work up the chain of command. In prosecutors’
parlance, lower level participants are “flipped” or “rolled” to
provide evidence against higher level participants in the scheme.
Second, as Deep Throat famously instructed Bob Woodward
and Carl Bernstein, in corruption cases, as in organized crime
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cases, investigators must “follow the money.”115 Money is the
lifeblood of corrupt networks, just as it is with criminal
enterprises.116 Both exist primarily in order to extract a profit from
illicit activities. In cases of entrenched bureaucratic corruption,
proceeds flow upward from lower level participants to higher level
figures just as they do in an organized crime enterprise. Since
proving receipt of the money (or some similarly valuable benefit) is
the key to proving the crime, a failure to follow the money is
usually fatal to a corruption prosecution—like a murder case
without a body or a weapon.
Third, law enforcement must be able to secure the cooperation
of witnesses with knowledge of the crime. Without witnesses who
can testify at a public trial, there can be no prosecution. In
corruption cases, as in organized crime cases, witnesses who can
provide direct evidence of the crime generally have no incentive to
report it or fear the consequences of coming forward. These
consequences may include threats, harassment, workplace or
professional retaliation, economic and social isolation by other
members of the witness’ industry, business or social group, and in
many countries, violent retribution.
To most experienced public corruption prosecutors, the
importance of these strategies is readily apparent. Following a
2003 international conference on the effective prosecution of
corruption cases in Asia and the Pacific, conference organizers
reported the key findings of the conference to be that corruption
suspects continue to benefit from banking secrecy laws and the
lack of whistleblower protection laws to encourage reporting.
Nevertheless, they reported, “[t]he strategies of ‘starting at a low
level, and working one’s way up’ and ‘following the money’ have
proven particularly efficient even in corruption cases involving
high-ranking,
influential
perpetrators
and
international
transactions.”117
ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Warner Bros. Pictures 1976).
See Bruce G. Ohr, Effective Methods to Combat Transnational Organized Crime
in Criminal Justice Processes, in United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders [UNAFEI], Resource
Material Series No. 58, 40, 55 (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.unafei.or.jp
/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no58/58-05.pdf (“It cannot be overstated that making
money is the primary goal of organized crime and transnational criminal
activities.”).
117 ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, supra note 27, at
xii.
115
116
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3.2. Key Investigative Tools and Techniques
Proactive corruption investigation requires tools and
techniques that permit investigators to “get inside” the corrupt
networks, “follow the money,” and secure trial witnesses and other
evidence. These include both laws that authorize law enforcement
activities that facilitate evidence-gathering, and laws that allow
prosecutors to pursue criminal conduct that supports the criminal
enterprise. Long experience in the United States has proven the
effectiveness of these mechanisms for attacking corruption.118 The
key evidence-gathering tools are laws that (1) protect witnesses
who offer evidence of the corruption crimes from workplace
retaliation; (2) authorize undercover operations; (3) authorize
access to financial documents, including bank records; and (4)
establish mechanisms by which prosecutors can offer immunity or
sentencing leniency to those who provide valuable evidence
against others in a corrupt network. Another key strategy is the
targeting of associated criminal conduct.
Investigators and
prosecutors in many other countries use similar tools, and the
UNCAC encourages the adoption of each of these procedures.

118 In comparing U.S. laws to those in Indonesia, we focus on federal criminal
law and procedure rather than the laws of the fifty states. This is partly out of
convenience, since the laws of the states vary in detail, although many state laws
and procedures are similar to the federal procedures discussed here. It is also
because, since at least the early 1970s, federal investigators and prosecutors have
been a primary law enforcement weapon against public corruption, even at the
state and local level, and there is therefore a long and tested track record of the
use of federal criminal laws and procedures in the area of corruption eradication.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS
OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2006, at 44–46 tbls.1 & 2, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/arpt-2006.pdf (showing that 407
federal officials and 241 local officials were convicted on federal corruption
charges in 2006, and presenting data for multiple years); see also Charles F. C. Ruff,
Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law
Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1171–72 (1977) (discussing federal
prosecutors’ decision whether to retain jurisdiction or hand a case over to the local
authorities when the case involves violations of both federal and state laws); Sara
Sun Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government’s Authority to Prosecute
Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions and a
Proposal, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 699–700 (2000) (discussing federal prosecutors’ use
of federal statutes to prosecute state and local government officials for
corruption).
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Whistleblower Protection Laws

A specific form of witness interference particularly relevant to
public corruption cases is workplace retaliation against those who
report corruption or fraud that comes to their attention in the
course of their employment. Protecting “whistleblowers” and
thereby encouraging them to come forward is critical to effective
detection of public corruption.119 These persons often provide the
initial lead for investigators, and may subsequently become
undercover informants or important trial witnesses for the
prosecution.
As noted above, public corruption, such as
corruption involving the misuse of public resources, often involves
a small circle of participants and conduct that is carried out away
from public view. Employees who observe criminal conduct in the
workplace by colleagues and superiors are uniquely situated to
expose that conduct and to assist investigators, but they are also
uniquely vulnerable to workplace retaliation and harassment. The
assurance of legal protection against retaliation is an important
factor in promoting disclosure of corrupt activity and preventing
efforts to cover up the crime or interfere with the reporting party’s
efforts to assist law enforcement.120 Article 33 of the UNCAC urges
119 In 2001, a whistleblower in the California Commissioner of Insurance’s
Office revealed information that led to the resignation of the Commissioner and
the prosecution of persons associated with the embezzlement and diversion of
public funds in the Commissioner’s office. See State Bar Exonerates Quackenbush
Whistleblower, CAL. B.J., Jan. 2001, available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/2cbj
/01jan/page24-1.htm (noting that leaking of confidential client information by
state attorney whistleblower was not considered unethical conduct because it was
protected by California’s whistleblower law).
120 At least three federal whistleblower protection statutes are expressly
dedicated to the protection of persons who report potential criminal activity. One
provision, enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, makes it a crime punishable
by up to ten years to retaliate against whistleblowers who provide information to
law enforcement relating to the possible commission of a federal offense. 18
U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2006). Another provision of the Act provides for restraining
orders to prevent retaliation against whistleblowers, and another allows
whistleblowers to recover compensatory damages and other remedies for
persecution. Id. §§ 1514, 5328. A plethora of other federal, state, and local laws
provide whistleblower protection. Some federal whistleblower laws apply to
categories of government employees, such as federal employees generally.
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–(b)(9) (2006). Others apply
specifically to military employees, military contract workers, members of the
Coast Guard, and foreign service employees: Military Whistleblower Protection
Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1034(b) (2006); Contractor Employees of the Armed Forces Act, 10
U.S.C § 2409 (2006); Protection of Seamen Against Discrimination Act, 46 U.S.C §
2114 (2006); and the Foreign Service Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3905(b)(2) (2006). Other laws
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parties to enact laws providing “protection against any unjustified
treatment” for whistleblowers.121
Typically, whistleblower protection laws prohibit workplace
retaliation such as termination, suspension, demotion, or
discriminatory treatment, on account of the employee’s action in
reporting suspected unlawful or unsafe conduct to a superior, or to
an administrative, regulatory or investigative government agency.
The protections may be enforced through civil or administrative
remedies against the employer122 or through criminal sanctions.123
3.2.2.

Undercover Operations

The term “undercover operation” covers a broad spectrum of
covert investigative scenarios, from operations that may last for
years, involving undercover agents infiltrating an organized
criminal network, to a single telephone call between a cooperating
witness and a target.124 In all cases, however, undercover activity
protect private sector employees who report various types of unlawful acts or
conditions. E.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006);
Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1367 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2006). All fifty states have enacted
whistleblower protection statutes. See National Conference of State Legislatures,
State
Whistleblower
Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/employ
/whistleblower.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). Many local and municipal
governments have also enacted such laws.
121 UNODC, supra note 31, at 120, 146.
122 Remedies may include reinstatement, back pay with interest, costs,
damages, attorney fees, and other measures.
123 In cases of retaliation against whistleblowers in a criminal investigation, of
course, there may also be criminal sanctions under obstruction of justice laws.
Such laws cover threats and harassment of potential witnesses, which could
include workplace retaliation. See infra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.
124 Ohr, supra note 116, at 48. In the United States, there is no single statute
which sets forth the nature and scope of law enforcement authority to conduct
undercover operations. The use of undercover strategies, and the admissibility
into evidence of statements of the defendant captured on audio or videotape, has
become a well-established feature of American criminal law. See 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(c) (2000) (stating that it is not unlawful “for a person acting under color of
law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a
party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception.”); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)
(admitting testimony of governmental agents regarding conversation they
overheard via a radio transmitter carried by an informant). Some criminal
statutes, such as the “sting money laundering” provision in section 1956(a)(3) of
Title 18, specifically contemplate undercover operations. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)
(2000).
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involves monitored communication between a law enforcement
officer or a person acting at the direction of law enforcement, and a
person suspected of engaging in criminal activity.125 Undercover
operations are generally used to gather firsthand information from
the targets about their involvement in past or future offenses, or
about a crime while it is underway. The term includes what are
commonly called “sting” operations, in which members of law
enforcement offer the target an opportunity to commit a crime,
intending to gather evidence of the defendant’s attempt to do so.
Another undercover tactic is a “controlled delivery” in which a
prearranged delivery of money or contraband is made to the
suspect in a monitored setting, after which the suspect is arrested.
Sometimes such operations involve a law enforcement agent
going undercover, that is, using an assumed identity for purposes
of the operation. At other times, an informant or cooperating
witness is used, who takes direction from law enforcement. In all
undercover operations, law enforcement aspires to record the
targets themselves as they discuss, plan, or implement criminal
behavior.126 UNCAC’s article 50(1) requires that parties shall, to
the extent permitted by domestic law, take measures to permit the
use by appropriate authorities of controlled delivery operations,
electronic surveillance, and undercover operations, “and to allow
for the admissibility in court of evidence derived therefrom.”127

125 Undercover operations, therefore, are distinct from activities involving the
interception of communications between persons where no participant in the
communications has consented to monitoring by law enforcement. That type of
evidence gathering, commonly called a wire tap, requires court authorization, and
is a more cumbersome investigative tool, used with far less frequency in public
corruption investigations. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516–22.
126 See, e.g., United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1071, 1076–77 (9th Cir.
1991) (discussing evidence of $3,000 bribe paid by undercover FBI agent to State
Senator); see also Allan Lengel, FBI Says Jefferson Was Filmed Taking Cash: Affidavit
Details Sting on Lawmaker, WASH. POST, May 22, 2006, at A1 (discussing
investigation of Congressman William J. Jefferson, who was filmed taking a
briefcase with $100,000 from a person who was cooperating with the FBI); Dan
Eggen, Alaska Senator’s Calls Were Secretly Taped, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2007, at A10
(discussing an Alaska corruption investigation and an oil industry figure’s role in
recording calls with various elected officials).
127 UNODC, supra note 31, at 210. In its legislative guide, the U.N. Office of
Drugs and Crime observes that “[t]hese techniques are especially useful in dealing
with sophisticated organized criminal groups because of the dangers and
difficulties inherent in gaining access to their operations and gathering
information and evidence for use in domestic prosecutions,” and that less
intrusive methods will often not prove effective. Id. at 211.
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Of course, the conduct of undercover operations by law
enforcement raises serious questions of inducement, intent, and
interference with individual rights.
Both substantive128 and
129
are necessary to cabin the use of this
procedural protections
powerful investigative technique to appropriate boundaries. But
when gathered under supervised conditions, evidence from
128 In the United States, legal doctrines that have emerged through case law
in the course of the development of undercover investigations have also served to
define the boundaries of appropriate undercover operations. Constitutional
individual rights define the limits to law enforcement conduct. Additionally, a
common defense raised in “sting” cases, in which law enforcement facilitates the
defendant’s conduct in attempting to commit a crime in the course of the
monitored communications, is entrapment. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S.
540 (1992) (finding entrapment where defendant, charged with purchasing child
pornography, had been targeted by law enforcement agents who had mailed
dozens of solicitations to the defendant offering to sell child pornography). Under
federal law, law enforcement may “afford opportunities or facilities for the
commission of the offense.” Id. at 548. But entrapment is a valid defense where it
can be shown that the government agent induced an innocent person to commit a
crime. See id. at 542 (reversing conviction “[b]ecause the Government overstepped
the line between setting a trap for the ‘unwary innocent’ and the ‘unwary
criminal’”). An informant who pushes too hard, or who essentially hounds an
innocent target until the target ultimately agrees to a criminal course of action,
will be found to have entrapped the target. An entrapment defense is defeated,
however, if it can be shown either that the defendant was already disposed to
commit the crime prior to being contacted by the government agent, or that the
government agent did not induce him to commit the crime. Accordingly, most
law enforcement agencies will not authorize an undercover operation unless there
is sufficient “predication,” that is, a documented, pre-existing basis to believe that
the target has already committed, or is willing to commit, a particular type of
crime. Under federal law, where a defendant is predisposed to commit the crime,
there can be no valid entrapment defense. Such basis could be established by
evidence of similar prior conduct by the target, or reliable reports about the
target’s current activities. Predication serves to ensure both that the target
selection is based on factual criteria and not arbitrary or irrelevant factors, and
that a defense of entrapment is unlikely to succeed.
129 These may include intra-agency rules as to how to conduct undercover
operations to ensure they are consistent with constitutional rights and
requirements that instigation of undercover operations be approved by a
coordinating entity. The FBI, for example, requires approval from a federal
prosecutor before an agent may authorize the recording of any conversations
involving informants, and undercover operations are subject to careful review.
See JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf. In addition, the U.S. Department
of Justice requires written authorization from the Office of Enforcement
Operations in the Criminal Division in Washington before certain types of inperson contacts may be monitored. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY MANUAL §9-7.302, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa
/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/7mcrm.htm#9-7.302.
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undercover operations often provides the most compelling
evidence of a defendant’s guilt. Such evidence portrays the
defendant himself, in his own words, without the benefit of
coaching, the filter of a witness’s memory, or the spin of an
attorney’s argument. Video or audio tapes that capture the
defendant’s quotidian behavior in his own office, home, or car,
have an authenticity and immediacy that no other type of evidence
can match. Public corruption prosecutions are often built around
undercover evidence, and it may be the high point of the
government’s presentation at trial.
Defendants in public
corruption cases often argue that they lacked corrupt intent, that
their words were misinterpreted, or that the prosecution is
motivated by extraneous factors. A videotape of an official
pocketing cash from an undercover agent, however, or a recorded
telephone call in which the defendant promises to exercise his
influence in exchange for money, can be extremely powerful
evidence that sweeps such defenses away.130
Undercover operations provide a powerful investigative
advantage, allowing law enforcement to get inside a network of
criminal players and gather evidence over time. A standard
feature of corruption investigations is the introduction of an
undercover agent or informant who conducts extensive
undercover activity with numerous targets. Such investigations
typically start with a small number of identified targets as to whom
there is predication—that is, a basis for suspecting those targets’
involvement in corrupt activity. More targets may be added to the
investigation as the undercover agent is introduced to additional
participants or referred to other persons involved in similar
criminal activity. Likewise, those who are approached and who
emphatically decline an opportunity to participate in corrupt
conduct are dropped as targets. The undercover operation may
continue for as long as it can still effectively gather evidence of
criminal corruption. While the undercover operation is underway,
law enforcement agents may take other investigative measures that
do not endanger the undercover operation, such as surveillance or

130 As a matter of evidence, a defendant’s statements, if relevant, are always
admissible in federal criminal trials. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). A statement by a
defendant’s agent is also admissible. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C)–(D). Statements of
co-conspirators, made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, are also
admissible. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). These rules give ample room for the use of
evidence gathered in undercover operations.
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obtaining grand jury subpoenas for bank account records. At some
point, when the operation has run its course (or is in danger of
being exposed), investigators and prosecutors will plan a “takedown,” a coordinated operation that usually involves the execution
of multiple arrest warrants and search warrants. At that point, the
“covert” stage of the investigation is over, and the “overt” stage
begins, during which prosecutors may interview witnesses, obtain
official records, and gather other evidence necessary to make the
case.
3.2.3.

Access to Financial Records

Access to bank account and other financial records is another
critical aspect of corruption investigations. In the United States,
federal investigators and prosecutors have ready access to financial
records through the use of subpoenas issued through an
investigating grand jury.131 The heart of almost any public
corruption case is the pecuniary benefit flowing to the corrupt
official. If the benefit can be documented in the hands of the
official, the case is half won. Conversely, if the flow of the money
to the defendant or his family or associates cannot be tracked and
then proven at trial, a public corruption prosecution has little
prospect of success. The UNCAC, article 40, takes specific aim at
the barrier that bank secrecy laws can pose to the investigation and
prosecution of public corruption. The article states simply that
parties to the Convention “shall ensure that, in the case of domestic
criminal investigations of offenses established in accordance with
this Convention, there are appropriate mechanisms available
within its domestic legal system to overcome obstacles that may
arise out of the application of bank secrecy laws.”132
Bank records are often obtained at the outset of an
131 The grand jury, an outgrowth of medieval English law, is an unusual
feature of U.S. criminal procedure with few parallels in other countries. The
federal government and several states still rely on grand juries as an integral part
of the system for investigating and charging felony offenses. In its modern form
under federal law, grand juries in each federal district consist of between sixteen
and twenty-three persons selected from the public, who meet periodically to hear
testimony, issue subpoenas, and vote on indictments. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
132 UNODC, supra note 31, at 123.
The Legislative Guide notes that the
Article is intended to address the inability of investigators to access financial
records, a “major hurdle” to the investigation of crimes with financial aspects. Id.
at 153.
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investigation to corroborate information from a whistleblower or
other informant, or to provide predication for an undercover
operation. During the covert stage of an investigation, bank
accounts related to persons who receive money from an
undercover agent may be subpoenaed in order to help track the
movement of the money, or to help identify other persons who
have made payments to the same person. Later in an investigation,
bank records may establish probable cause for a search warrant.
Once the investigation is overt, witnesses may be required to
produce bank records or other documents relating to the financial
activity that is the focus of the investigation. Analysis of records
for one bank account often points to other accounts or businesses,
as incoming deposits or outgoing checks or transfers draw the
attention of investigators and prosecutors. Such an analysis may
also lead to the identification of additional conspirators, the
location of assets purchased with proceeds of the offense, or to the
development of prosecution theories based on anti-money
laundering laws. In a lengthy investigation, the relatively prompt
production of business records by banks, credit card companies,
escrow companies, retail establishments, and similar businesses is
often what drives the investigation forward.
Many countries, including Indonesia, have enacted laws
requiring public officials to disclose assets or certain
transactions.133 Many countries have also criminalized illicit
enrichment, that is, the “significant increase in the assets of a
public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation
to his or her lawful income.”134 Investigation of this crime, clearly,
133 UNCAC, supra note 28, art. 8(4) (“Each State Party shall also consider, in
accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, establishing
measures and systems to facilitate the reporting by public officials of acts of
corruption to appropriate authorities, when such acts come to their notice in the
performance of their functions.”); Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 13(a) (Indon.)
(authorizing the KPK to construct lists and conduct checks on reports on the
wealth of government executives); Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 16 (Indon.)
(requiring civil servants and government officials to report any gratification they
have received); Law Number 28 of 1999 on a Corruption-free State
Administration, art. 5 (Indon.); see KPK GAP REPORT, supra note 7 (noting that
Japan, Korea and Thailand have laws which only require high level officials to
report their assets, while Belgium, Nepal and the Philippines extend the reporting
duties to the families and relatives of public officials).
134 UNCAC, supra note 28, art. 20. See UNODC, supra note 31, at 103 & 103 n.
56 (noting that several jurisdictions have found such a statute to be helpful,
including France, Kenya and the Netherlands). Such statutes are particularly
powerful in combination with burden shifting laws, such as one in Indonesia,
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cannot even begin without effective access to bank records and
other documents relating to assets, in order to allow investigators
and prosecutors to gauge a public official’s wealth.
Bank records or other records of financial transactions are often
the key documents presented in evidence at trial in a public
corruption prosecution. Such documents may provide details
about the possession and movement of money on specific dates,
information that is key to proving most corruption charges. Bank
account records, or records of normal real estate or other financial
transactions, are largely unassailable as evidence; as documents
created in the normal course of business, their accuracy is usually
undisputed. Because business records don’t lie, they provide ideal
corroboration to the testimony of an informant, whose motives,
veracity, or recollection of events will be vigorously challenged by
defense attorneys.
3.2.4.

Immunity and Sentence Reduction Mechanisms

As with dismantling crime syndicates, a key strategy in
exposing and eradicating hidden networks of corruption is to turn
one participant in the enterprise against others. Prosecutors
generally start with lower level figures and work “up the chain,”
offering inducements—either immunity or sentence reduction—to
the underlings to produce evidence that will incriminate the critical
players.
The legal authority to grant immunity in exchange for a
witness’s sworn testimony is a valuable tool in executing this
strategy. Under the United States model, a prosecutor may seek a
court order compelling a witness to testify, and granting that
witness “use” immunity for his testimony, meaning that the
government cannot use the evidence he provides against him in a
subsequent trial.135 Failure to testify once an immunity order is
issued can lead to civil or criminal contempt-of-court charges.136
which shifts to the public official the duty to disclose legitimate sources of wealth.
Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 48 (Indon.).
135 In obtaining Department of Justice approval to offer a witness immunity,
federal prosecutors must demonstrate that (1) “the testimony or other information
from such individual may be necessary to the public interest” and (2) the
individual “has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.” 18 U.S.C. §
6003(b).
136 A less formal mechanism for inducing cooperation frequently used early
in a federal investigation with respect to persons who had minimal involvement
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A more common tool by which U.S. prosecutors secure the
testimony of “insiders” in public corruption cases is a cooperation
agreement. Cooperation agreements are usually negotiated as part
of a plea bargain, in which the defendant is required to admit guilt
to one or more criminal offenses, and to incur some type of
criminal liability. As part of the agreement, the defendant agrees
to fully and truthfully cooperate with the prosecution, including
disclosing information and providing testimony in court. If the
defendant provides truthful and substantial cooperation, the
prosecutor agrees to file a motion at the time of sentencing
requesting that the judge reduce the defendant’s sentence to reflect
the nature and value of the defendant’s cooperation.137
The Convention endorses the use of both sentence reduction
mechanisms and grants of immunity in corruption cases to induce
the cooperation of participants in the crime. Article 37(1) requires
that states “take appropriate measures to encourage persons who
participate or have participated” in corruption offenses “to supply
information useful to competent authorities for investigative and
evidentiary purposes,” and to provide other factual help.138 Article
37 then goes on to specifically urge states to enact measures
in the criminal activity, is a “non-target” letter. A “non-target” letter is simply a
letter provided by a prosecutor to a potential witness (or the witness’s attorney),
assuring the witness that, based on information currently in the prosecutor’s
possession, the witness is not considered a “target” of the investigation. A
“target” is someone whom the prosecutor believes has committed a criminal act,
and as to whom the prosecutor believes he will have sufficient evidence to charge
with a crime. In cases involving many participants, witnesses with some
knowledge of the crime, however minor or innocent, may be reluctant to
cooperate with law enforcement for fear of becoming ensnared in the prosecution.
“Non-target” letters are extremely helpful in encouraging such witnesses to come
forward with information.
This procedure is based on the concept of
prosecutorial discretion, a concept well-developed in U.S. law, but which is
largely non-existent in Indonesia and many other countries.
137 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2007); Ohr, supra note 116,
at 54. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Former Ney Aide Gets No Prison Time, USA TODAY,
Aug. 16, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-08-16-neycorruption_N.htm (describing sentencing of William Heaton, a former aide to
Congressman Robert Ney, who cooperated with investigators and taped
telephone calls and a meeting with Ney); Karen Tumulty, The Plot Thickens, TIME,
Dec. 5, 2005, at 40–41 (describing guilty plea of Michael Scanlon, former associate
of Jack Abramoff, and Scanlon’s agreement to testify against Abramoff and Ney);
Larry Welborn & Peggy Lowe, Jaramillo Cooperates with Feds Over Investigation,
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Oct. 30, 2007, at B1 (describing assistant sheriff’s guilty
plea and agreement to cooperate against his former boss, the elected county
sheriff, who was subsequently indicted).
138 UNODC, supra note 31, at 121, 149.
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permitting “mitigating punishment of an accused person” and/or
the “granting of immunity from prosecution to a person,” if the
person “provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or
prosecution” of corruption crimes.139
The information provided by an immunized witness or
cooperating defendant can be a tremendous evidence-gathering
tool, both in strengthening the government’s case against known
targets, or in initiating new investigations. They may be asked to
produce documents, lead investigators to other evidence, and if it
is still feasible, they may be directed to make recorded telephone
calls or to meet with other targets of the investigation and record
those meetings. The cooperation agreement mechanism not only
yields valuable evidence, but gives prosecutors critical leverage
within the criminal network. Since a participant in a corrupt
relationship is usually in a position to provide highly incriminating
evidence against other participants, the knowledge that an
“insider” is cooperating with the prosecution is often enough on its
own to convince other defendants to plead guilty. Because the first
person to cooperate in an investigation often provides the most
valuable information to investigators, that defendant often gets the
largest reduction in sentence. Thus, once an investigation becomes
overt and the scope of the investigation becomes known, or after
indictment, lesser targets or defendants often “race” to be the first
one in the case to cooperate, cracking the corrupt network wide
open.
The concepts of conferring immunity on an individual with
potential culpability, and of striking an agreement with a
defendant to recommend a lesser sentence in exchange for
testimony or other assistance, are foreign to the civil law tradition
that includes Indonesia’s system. Many civil law countries have
introduced reforms in recent years which borrow and modify
various features of the Anglo-American tradition, however.140
Procedures for enlisting the assistance of criminal suspects or
defendants through immunity or sentence reductions are among
those concepts which have increasingly taken root in civil law
countries. Peru, one of the “French family” of civil law countries
like Indonesia, adopted an immunity procedure for corruption

Id.; UNCAC, supra note 28, arts. 37(2)–(3).
Langer, supra note 99, at 39–62 (discussing emergence of various forms of
plea bargaining in Germany, Italy, Argentina, and France).
139
140
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cases which was later extended to other types of criminal cases.141
Italy has a similar immunity and sentence reduction mechanism
for kidnapping crimes.142 The Philippines, Nepal and Mongolia
have provisions which allow for immunity for those who bribe
public officials, so that they can be free to testify.143 South Korea
allows courts to mitigate the sentences of whistleblowers that come
forward with information about a crime in which the
whistleblower was involved.144
3.2.5.

Prosecuting Associated Crimes

A common and effective strategy for targeting public
corruption is to integrate the investigation of those crimes with the
investigation of other closely related conduct under other criminal
statutes.
These statutes are not the anti-corruption laws
themselves, but statutes that provide investigators with the
jurisdictional latitude needed to gather the relevant information
bearing on corrupt conduct and provide prosecutors with the
evidence and legal theories to convert that information into
criminal convictions. Evidence of other criminal violations can
lead investigators to evidence of corruption, or can be used to
pressure targets or their associates into providing information
about corruption crimes. In the United States, prosecutors are
authorized to simultaneously investigate multiple crimes, and can
employ a variety of criminal statutes, depending on the conduct
under investigation.
Several substantive criminal laws are
invaluable tools for U.S. investigators and prosecutors in public
corruption cases.
One group of statutes regularly used in prosecuting corruption
cases is the anti-money laundering laws.145 Both public corruption
141 See Nelly Calderón Navarro, Fighting Corruption: The Peruvian Experience, 4
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 488, 493–500 (2006) (describing Peruvian Act No. 27378 which
enables negotiated justice).
142 Gherardo Colombo, Investigating and Prosecuting Large-scale Corruption, 4 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 510, 512 (2006) (describing Italy’s sentence reduction mechanism).
Italy also has a plea bargaining procedure that borrows from the American
system. Langer, supra note 99, at 46–53.
143 ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia & the Pacific, supra note 4,
at 50.
144 Id.
145 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957. See, e.g., United States v. Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642,
645 (9th Cir. 2007) (referencing money laundering conviction of former Ukrainian
Prime Minister for laundering proceeds of foreign corruption); United States v.
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and money laundering offenses usually entail the concealment of
financial transactions, and a money laundering theory can broaden
the scope of a corruption investigation beyond the corrupt act itself
to the ultimate disposition of the proceeds. Charging the crimes
together has several benefits as a matter of prosecution strategy. In
a trial where evidence of both a corrupt transaction and the
subsequent laundering of the proceeds can be presented, the
totality of the evidence is often much more compelling. Money
laundering evidence frequently will include documentation of
expenditures by the defendants and evidence of concealment,
which can support a motive theory and allow a fuller presentation
of the defendants’ corrupt conduct. Recognizing the connection
between corruption and money laundering, article 14 of the
UNCAC mandates that parties institute a comprehensive domestic
regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank
financial institutions.146 Because proceeds of corruption are rarely
reported to taxing authorities, criminal tax evasion laws are also a
useful weapon against corruption.147
A second group of useful substantive statutes are obstruction
of justice laws, including statutes protecting witnesses.148 Statutes
Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370, 1385–86 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming convictions in a
corruption case, including money laundering); United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d
1068, 1075–77 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming money laundering conviction of a state
senator); Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Warner, No. 02-CR-506
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (public corruption case against former Illinois Governor, including
money laundering and structuring charges); David M. Herszenhorn, Grand Jury
Indicts Arizona Congressman, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at A9 (reporting corruption
and money laundering charges against Congressman).
146 UNODC, supra note 31, at 43–51.
147 See, e.g., Charles R. Babcock & Jonathan Weisman, Congressman Admits
Taking Bribes, Resigns, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2005, at A1 (discussing Congressman
Randy Cunningham’s guilty pleas to tax evasion and bribery charges); Jerry Bier,
Setencich Convicted in Tax Case: Ex-Assembly Speaker is Found Guilty on a 1996 Charge
but is Acquitted of a ‘97 Count, FRESNO BEE, June 30, 2000, at A1 (describing the
conviction of former California Assembly Speaker on tax evasion charge); Paula
McMahon, Jenne Weeps at Sentencing—Former Broward Sheriff Jailed Year and a Day,
Fined $3,000, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 17, 2007, at 1A (discussing the
sentencing of sheriff on tax evasion and corruption charges).
148 Federal prosecutors frequently include obstruction of justice charges in
indictments in public corruption cases. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Ford,
No. 05-20201B (W.D. Tenn. 2005) (indicting state legislator for various crimes,
including three counts of witness intimidation); Fourth Superseding Indictment,
United States v. McFall, Cr. S-02-468 MCE (E.D. Cal. 2004) (public corruption case
involving five defendants, including local and state officials, and charging various
defendants, in addition to corruption offenses, with perjury, false statements to
investigators, and witness tampering); Indictment, United States v. Traficant, No.
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criminalizing the deliberate destruction of documents, lying to
investigators, and perjury are also frequently utilized by anticorruption prosecutors.149 Witness protection laws have become
key weapons in corruption cases in the United States,150 and the
importance of these laws in corruption cases is also recognized in
the UNCAC.151 Witness tampering and intimidation is a common
feature of public corruption investigations. Undetected, it greatly
diminishes the chances for a successful prosecution. When such
acts can be charged along with the corruption crimes and evidence
of them can be gathered and presented in court, however, it greatly
enhances the prospects for a conviction, both on the obstruction
and the underlying offense. Testimony of a witness, forensic
evidence of an email sent from the defendant’s computer, or, best
of all, a surreptitiously recorded telephone conversation with a
defendant, which establishes that the defendant attempted to
influence another’s testimony or intimidate a witness, can be
devastating to a defendant’s case. Such conduct is materially
01-CR-207 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (indicting a congressman on various charges
including obstruction of justice for attempting to persuade another person to
provide false testimony and destroy evidence).
149 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1510(a) (obstruction of criminal investigations); id. §
1516 (obstruction of federal audits); id. §§ 1517–1518 (obstruction of examinations
of financial institutions and criminal health care investigations); id. § 1519
(destruction of records); id. § 1001 (false statements); id. §§ 1621–1623 (perjury).
150 In the United States, a wide variety of federal statutes are available to
charge persons who attempt to improperly influence, intimidate, or injure
witnesses. Tampering with witnesses, victims, or informants through physical
force, threats, or corrupt persuasion is a serious crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1512.
Punishments range from the potential death penalty for killing a witness, and a
maximum of 20 years for attempted use of force against a witness, down to a
maximum of a year for harassing a witness and thereby hindering or delaying her
testimony. Id. § 1512(a)(3) & (d). A general obstruction statute prohibits the use
of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information
concerning a federal crime to a criminal investigator. Id. § 1510(a). Threatening,
intimidating, or corruptly influencing a juror is a crime. Id. § 1503.
151 Article 25(a) of the UNCAC mandates that parties to the convention
criminalize not only the use of force, threats and intimidation against witnesses,
but also the “promise, offering or giving of an undue advantage to induce false
testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony . . . .” UNODC, supra note 31,
at 80, 94–95. Thus the obligation under the convention “is to criminalize the use
both of the corrupt means, such as bribery, and of coercive means, such as the use
or threat of violence.” Id. at 94. Article 32 requires that parties enact measures to
provide effective protection for witnesses from potential retaliation or
intimidation. These measures can include programs for physical protection of the
witnesses, evidentiary rules to protect their identity, and rules to ensure the safety
of witnesses while testifying. Id. at 119, 141–46.
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inconsistent with a defense based on the notion that the defendant
had no criminal intent in committing the underlying act and has
nothing to hide.
Prosecutors in the United States also commonly make use of
the general conspiracy law, which criminalizes agreements to
commit other federal criminal offenses, and can be used to broaden
the scope of almost any investigation. Because conspiracy offenses
can last for months or even years, and can include the conduct of a
variety of actors with varying levels of culpability, they are ideal
weapons for targeting the networks that engage in illegal
corruption.152 Search warrants and other investigative techniques
predicated on conspiracy laws may legitimately gather evidence
not only of a specific corrupt transaction, but of the nature and
history of the relationships that gave rise to the transaction.153
Accordingly, prosecutors can make use of conspiracy laws to target
and “flip” peripheral players who may provide incriminating
evidence against the primary targets.154 While the UNCAC does
not call expressly for enactment of a conspiracy law, it advocates
the enactment of criminal laws targeting persons who participate
in, instigate, or are accomplices to, the criminal conduct.155
3.3. The Use of Key Procedural Tools to Investigate and Prosecute
Public Corruption
Collectively, the statutes and procedures described above are
the key tools which investigators and prosecutors use in almost all
152 18 U.S.C. § 371.
Some other commonly used federal anti-corruption
statutes include their own conspiracy provisions. See, e.g., id. § 1951(a)
(conspiracies to commit extortion under color of official right); id. § 1956(h)
(money laundering conspiracy); id. § 286 (conspiracy to submit fraudulent claims
to the government).
153 The Federal Bureau of Investigation frequently utilizes an “enterprise
theory of investigation,” which focuses on targeting, diagramming, and
dismantling whole criminal networks, rather than simply gathering evidence to
prove a particular crime by a particular individual. Richard A. McFeely,
Enterprise Theory of Investigation, 70 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 19 (May 2001),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2001/may01leb.pdf. Under a
conspiracy theory, culpability extends beyond the principals in the corrupt
transactions at the heart of the investigation to other persons who facilitated or
concealed the corrupt activity, or those who knowingly assisted or benefited from
the crime. Id.
154 Co-conspirator statements, that is, statements made in furtherance of a
criminal scheme are admissible in evidence in federal cases as exceptions to the
hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
155 UNCAC, supra note 28, art. 27; UNODC, supra note 31, at 114–15.
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major corruption investigations and prosecutions in the United
States. Indeed, the classic pattern for corruption investigations led
by the FBI makes use of all of these procedures to get on the inside
of corrupt networks, follow the money, and secure witnesses and
evidence: a whistleblower or other informant helps to initiate a
lengthy undercover operation, the information gathered in that
operation is corroborated and supported by the gathering and
analysis of relevant financial records, the covert phase of the
investigation concludes with a takedown in which multiple
persons are charged, and prosecutors then negotiate guilty pleas
and cooperation agreements with those defendants who are
essentially caught red-handed. The information provided by
cooperating defendants snagged early in the investigation,
together with analysis of more financial records and other
investigation, is used to develop cases against additional
defendants.
Even after the investigation has gone overt,
cooperating defendants sometimes can gather information in an
undercover capacity—particularly evidence of obstruction of
justice offenses by new targets of the investigation. Statutes used
in the ensuing prosecution typically include money laundering, tax
evasion, obstruction of justice, or conspiracy.
Examples of successful corruption investigations following this
methodology are legion: the Abscam investigation in the late
1970s, in which sixteen persons, including six congressmen and a
U.S. senator were convicted after a two year investigation;156
Operation Greylord, a lengthy investigation of payoffs and
kickbacks in the Cook County judicial system in Illinois in the
1980s, which led to the conviction of dozens of judges, attorneys,
law enforcement officials, and a state legislator;157 Operation Rocky
Top, a 1980s corruption investigation which resulted in the
conviction of numerous state legislators and others in Tennessee;158
the BRISPEC investigation of corruption in the state legislature in
156 Robert D. McFadden, Williams’s Trial Is the Last of 8 Major Abscam Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1981, at 40 (describing Abscam investigation and resulting
convictions).
157 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Investigations of Public Corruption:
Rooting Crookedness Out of Government, March 15, 2004, www.fbi.gov
/page2/march04/greylord031504.htm (summarizing Operation Greylord on the
20th anniversary of the conviction of a court clerk convicted of collecting bribes
for Cook County judges).
158 Sandra Roberts, Before Tennessee Waltz, There Was Rocky Top, TENNESSEAN,
June 5, 2005, at 13A (describing the Rocky Top investigation and prosecutions).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/3

2008]

LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDONESIA

235

California in the late 1980s, in which a number of assemblymen,
state senators, staffers, and lobbyists were convicted after a long
undercover operation;159 Operation Lost Trust, an early 1990s
investigation into corruption in the South Carolina legislature
which resulted in the conviction of a state legislator and others;160
Operation Silver Shovel, a 1990s investigation of Chicago
municipal elected officials, city employees, and others that netted
multiple convictions;161 Operation Safe Road, a long-term
investigation of corruption in Illinois state government,
commenced in the late 1990s, which led to the convictions of scores
of persons, including the former governor;162 Operation Lively
Green, an investigation into corruption among military and law
enforcement personnel in Arizona;163 Operation Tennessee Waltz, a
recent investigation into corruption in the Tennessee legislature
which resulted in convictions of a dozen state officials;164 the

159 United States v. Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370, 1373–74 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 588-92 (9th Cir. 1993); Robert Reinhold, U.S. Agents
Seize Files In California Statehouse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1988, at A12.

160 United States v. Blanding, 250 F.3d 858 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Derrick, 163 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1998); 3 Carolina Politicians Are Indicted for Bribery,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1991, at A16.
161 Don Terry, An Admission Of Corruption Probably Isn’t Chicago’s Last, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1996, at A17 (reporting that a city councilman who had pleaded
guilty to taking bribes had agreed to cooperate by wearing a listening device in
the federal investigation and introducing a federal informant to other corruption
targets); FBI Chicago Div., FBI Major Investigation—Operation Silver Shovel,
http://chicago.fbi.gov/silvershovel/silvershovel.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
162 U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, N. DIST. OF ILL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OPERATION
SAFE ROAD: SUMMARY OF CASES 1 (2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osr
/osrcasesummary.pdf; Matt O’Connor & Rudolph Bush, Ryan Gets 6 Years, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 7, 2006, at 1.
163 Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Three Current and Former U.S. Soldiers
Plead Guilty to Participating in Bribery and Extortion Conspiracy (Mar. 24, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/March/06_crm_168.html;
Final
Two
Defendants in ‘Operation Lively Green’ are Sentenced, REUTERS, Mar. 24, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS174693+24-Mar2008+PRN20080324; see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 30.
164 Bonna Johnson, As Ford Goes to Prison, Ethics Laws on Trial, TENNESSEAN,
Aug. 29, 2007, http://m.tennessean.com/detail.jsp?key=91387&full=1; Tennessee
Waltz One Dozen Down, MEMPHIS COMMERICAL APPEAL.COM, Jan. 11, 2008,
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2008/Jan/11/tennessee-waltz-onedozen-down/; Press Release, FBI, Tennessee Waltz, The Dance is Over (May 2,
2008), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/may08/tennesseewaltz_050208.html.
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investigation of Congressman William Jefferson;165 an ongoing
investigation of corruption in Alaska which has resulted in seven
convictions to date including three legislators and an aide to the
former governor and in the indictment of a U.S. senator;166 and
Operation Broken Boards, an investigation of corruption among
state officials in New Jersey that resulted in a takedown in
September 2007 involving the arrest of eleven officials, including
two state assemblymen.167
A twenty-seven month FBI
investigation of municipal corruption in Dallas, which included the
use of informants, consensually recorded undercover telephone
calls, and the analysis of records for over two hundred bank
accounts, led recently to the indictment of sixteen persons,
including several public officials.168
The coordinated use of criminal statutes such as money
laundering, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice, and of
investigative procedures involving whistleblowers, undercover
operations, gathering and analysis of financial records, and
cooperation agreements with defendants, is not limited to large
scale corruption investigations. Such tools were used effectively in
a local investigation of corruption in the area of Fresno, California,
dubbed Operation Rezone, involving payoffs by developers to
local officials.
A series of prosecutions arising from that
investigation led to convictions of city councilmen, developers, and
others.169 In another corruption case, a single multi-defendant case
165 Jerry Markon & Allan Lengel, Lawmaker Indicted on Corruption Charges,
WASH. POST, June 5, 2007, at A1; Lengel, supra note 126.
166 Federal Agents Raid Legislative Offices, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 5,
2006,
http://dwb.adn.com/news/politics/fbi/story/8428723p-8036832c.html;
Karl Vick, ‘I’ll Sell My Soul to the Devil,’ WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2007, at A01; Press
Release, Dept. of Justice, Former Alaska State Representative Victor Kohring
Sentenced on Public Corruption Charges (May 8, 2008), http://anchorage.fbi.gov
/doj/pressrel/2008/publiccorruption050808.htm.
167 David W. Chen, New Jersey Officials Arrested in Corruption Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at B1.
168 Rudolph Bush, Cash Flowed Through Circle of Corruption, Prosecutors Allege,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 2, 2007, http://www.dallasnews.com
/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/DN-whathappened_02met.ART
.State.Edition2.42998e9.html; Dave Levinthal et al., City Hall Bribery Indictments ‘A
Sad
Day
or
Dallas,’
DALLAS
MORNING
NEWS,
Oct.
2,
2007,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/10020
7dnmetindictments.129b687ca.html. The main indictment in that case included
multiple conspiracy charges, including money laundering conspiracy.
Indictment, United States v. Donald Hill, No. 3:07-CR 289-R (N.D. Tex. 2007).
169 Mark Arax & Mark Gladstone, Leading Fresno Developer is Indicted on
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prosecuted in the Eastern District of California in 2003–05,
investigators and prosecutors used an undercover investigation, an
extensive analysis of bank account records, and numerous pleadand-cooperate agreements to secure guilty pleas from ten
defendants involved in a bribery ring that was making payments
to two U.S. State Department employees to obtain nonimmigrant
visas.170 In addition to bribery charges, the indictment in that case
included conspiracy and money laundering charges.
As noted above, the major obstacles to investigating and
prosecuting public corruption cases are universal in nature, and
similar mechanisms have repeatedly been used with great success
in other countries. In countries that have criminal procedures
allowing the use of investigative strategies similar to those
employed in the United States, the same methodology has had
equally impressive results. In the United Kingdom, Operation
Othona, a four year investigation into corruption in London’s
Metropolitan Police Service in the mid-1990s, led to the conviction
of numerous police officers.171 Investigators and prosecutors
worked together in the course of the investigation, using
informants, undercover operations, and the cooperation of
defendants to build their prosecutions.172 In Italy, a civil law
country like Indonesia, the multi-year Clean Hands investigation
of corrupt political officials in the 1990s employed similar tools—
the use of informants or whistleblowers, undercover operations,
the analysis of financial records, and bargaining with defendants to
secure their cooperation against other participants in the corrupt
network.173 Hundreds of persons were charged in the course of
that investigation, which profoundly shook Italian politics.174
Corruption Charges, DAILY REPUBLICAN, Feb. 21, 1998, http://www.dailyrepublican
.com/fresno_developer_indicted.html. See also United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d
1034 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming conviction for corruption-related offenses
committed during tenure as city councilman).
170 Indictment, United States v. Johnson, CR. No. S-03-202 GEB (E.D. Cal.
2004); Denny Walsh, Two Plead Guilty to Bribery for Visas, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 1,
2004, at A7.
171 John Dempsey-Brench, Investigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption:
Operation Othona, in ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, supra
note 27, at 52–60.
172 Id. at 53–58.
173 Colombo, supra note 142, at 520.
174 John Moody, Sick of It All, TIME, Mar. 8, 1993, at 48.
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The effectiveness of the criminal procedures described above in
rooting out public corruption has been demonstrated in the United
States and many other countries over the last thirty years.
Unfortunately, investigators and prosecutors in many countries in
the developing world, including Indonesia, are hamstrung by the
unavailability of such tools under the antiquated criminal
procedure regimes that define their authority.

4.

EQUIPPING LAW ENFORCEMENT TO SUCCEED:
PROGRESS AND REMAINING
GAPS IN INDONESIA

In only a few years, Indonesia has made substantial progress in
addressing multiple aspects of comprehensive anti-corruption
reform. As noted above, various steps are being taken to address
the widely recognized need for institutional reform and greater
law enforcement coordination. Criminal code reform has occurred
to update and define the core corruption crimes. But less attention
has been directed at modernizing the laws that enable law
enforcement to investigate and prosecute these cases effectively.
To the extent legislative reform has enhanced law enforcement’s
investigatory abilities, it has largely been directed at the KPK, a
short-term focus that leaves the nation’s primary law enforcement
institutions ill-equipped to sustain the anti-corruption effort over
the long term. Below we briefly assess the status of the Indonesian
criminal code with respect to the tools and techniques necessary to
investigate and prosecute public corruption effectively.
4.1. Whistleblower Protection Laws
Some Indonesian laws provide some types of protections to
whistleblowers, but none effectively shields them from the injury
they are most likely to suffer, which is professional or workplace
retaliation.175 In at least one instance, with respect to a state
175 Some rudimentary whistleblower provisions have been inserted into
recently enacted laws. Indonesia Corruption Watch, Protecting Whistle-blowers
in Corruption Cases, Aug. 28, 2006, http://www.antikorupsi.org/eng/index.php
?option=com_content&task=view&id=475&Itemid=2. The 1999 anti-corruption
law contained an article requiring that the identity of a reporting person not be

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/3

2008]

LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDONESIA

239

auditor who became a witness for the KPK, the KPK was able to
physically protect the witness with the assistance of the police, but
could not protect him from workplace retaliation.176 Corruption in
Indonesia is often entrenched in government agencies where it is
vertically integrated, in which lower level officials take in illegal
“fees” and commissions at the direction of higher officials, with the
proceeds flowing up the chain of command. Without adequate,
enforceable whistle-blower protection laws, lower level employees
in a position to observe and report corruption directed by higher
level officials as part of the vertically integrated corruption typical
in Indonesia are unlikely to come forward.
4.2. Undercover Operations
As described above, another impediment to effective anticorruption prosecution is the narrow and rigid structure of current
Indonesian evidence rules, which list the types of evidence
disclosed at trial, but there is no anti-retaliation provision in the law, or any
enforcement mechanism. Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption
Offences, art. 31(1) (Indon.). The 2002 anti-money laundering law, amended the
following year, is slightly better, although the scope of the protection afforded in
that statute is narrow—it appears to be intended to protect bank employees and
similarly situated persons who are mandated to report suspicious transactions,
similar to the U.S. statute which protects financial institution employees who
make reports. 31 U.S.C. § 5328 (2006). In the anti-money laundering law,
investigators, prosecutors, and judges are also required to keep the identity of a
reporting party secret, and the law contains a provision authorizing a suit for
damages by the reporting party if her identity is revealed in violation of the
statute. Law Number 15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as
amended by Law Number 25 of 2003, art. 39 (Indon.). Parties making reports
concerning money laundering or suspected money laundering are immune from
prosecution and civil suit for making such reports, and are entitled to “special
protection” against threats, although the nature of such protection is not specified.
Id. arts. 40, 42, 43. The law that created the KPK also obliged the KPK to “provide
protection to witnesses or whistle-blowers providing reports and information
regarding corrupt acts.” Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 15(a) (Indon.). The nature
of the “protection” to be provided is not specified, however, and there is no
enforcement mechanism to prevent workplace retaliation. The new witness
protection law includes a provision that purports to confer civil and criminal
immunity for witnesses or victims who testify. Law Number 13 of 2006 on
Protection of Witness and Victim, art. 10(1) (Indon.). While this is a significant
improvement, it still does not shield a whistleblower from professional or
workplace retaliation.
176 Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas, “We Will Protect the Witness,” TEMPO, Apr.
19–25, 2005 (on file with author); Informant Law a Must, JAKARTA POST, April 25,
2005, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/04/25/informant-law-must
.html. The case is described below in more detail in the text accompanying
footnotes 180–81.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

240

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 30:1

admissible in a criminal case.177 The evidence code does not
explicitly authorize undercover operations or list audiotapes as
admissible, which means that prosecutors cannot rely on being
able to use the fruits of such an investigation at trial. Additionally,
due both to distrust of law enforcement born of rampant
corruption and an outlook shaped by the non-adversarial civil law
system there, Indonesian judges remain suspicious of the
undercover technique and often view any interaction between law
enforcement and investigation targets as unlawful or inappropriate
entrapment.178
Because of the lack of express statutory authority, most
prosecutors are unfamiliar with the technique and it has been tried
in only a few cases.179 In one, the newly staffed KPK arranged a
sting operation in which a state audit agency official agreed to act
undercover and to wear a recording device. The auditor met with
a member of the General Elections Commission, who had planned
to bribe him to rig the audit of the Elections Commission. The two
met in a hotel room, and the discussion and payment of cash was
recorded on audiotape and videotape.180
The Elections Commission official was arrested at the scene
and subsequently convicted. The investigation that unfolded
following that arrest led to the conviction of several additional
members of the elections commission on corruption charges. This
See supra, Section 2.2.
There are several reasons why the use of undercover techniques such as
sting operations are more easily accepted in common law countries. First, in
common law countries members of law enforcement are generally presumed to be
able to engage in any conduct that is not illegal or unethical. By contrast, in many
civil law countries members of law enforcement are expected to take only those
actions for which they have express authorization. Second, in the common law
conception of criminal conduct, a crime involves both an act (actus reus) and
criminal intent (mens rea). Since law enforcement and those operating under
their direction have no criminal intent, but rather are attempting to enforce the
law, their conduct is not criminal. In many civil law countries, where crimes are
often defined purely by the nature of the act at issue, this distinction is less
meaningful.
179 Among prosecutors with whom we discussed undercover techniques,
there was little understanding of the concepts of predication and the defense of
entrapment. Indeed, prosecutors sometimes used the word “entrapment” to
mean a valid undercover contact.
180 Tony Hotland, KPK Determined to Uncover Graft in KPU, JAKARTA POST,
April
12,
2005,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/04/12/kpkdetermined-uncover-graft-kpu.html; KPU ‘Tactical Funds’ Were for BPK: Treasurer,
JAKARTA POST, April 14, 2005, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/04/14
/kpu-039tactical-funds039-were-bpk-treasurer.html.
177
178
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operation was one of the early successes of the KPK.181
In another, investigators with Timtas Tipikor were
investigating a complaint by a witness in a trial in south Jakarta
that the judge in the trial had been attempting to extort him. The
witness agreed to record a meeting with the judge’s clerk at a
restaurant, at which the witness was to hand over the money.
After the money was handed over, investigators confronted the
clerk, who then agreed to call the judge. The telephone call from
the clerk to the judge confirming the payment was recorded by
investigators. Satellite message system messages were also taken
as evidence. The judge was subsequently arrested, and later
convicted.182
But even these instances—apparent successes—illustrate how
undercover activity is not yet widely understood or accepted in
Indonesia. The powerful undercover evidence in the KPK’s highprofile investigation of the elections commission was accepted by
the new Anti-Corruption Court, although it might not have been
by other courts. The KPK’s cooperating auditor, however, was
criticized and then fired by the audit agency for his role in
uncovering the scandal, because his acts in discussing the bribe
with the elections commission official were deemed a violation of
the audit agency’s ethics code.183 In the Timtas Tipikor case,
although the recorded telephone call with the judge was
tantamount to a confession, prosecutors were unsure until the
middle of trial whether the court would accept the evidence of the
call. In each case, the undercover operation consisted of only a
single contact. To our knowledge, more elaborate undercover
operations have hardly ever been attempted in public corruption
investigations in Indonesia.184

181 Supreme Court Cuts Ex-KPU Chief’s Jail Sentence, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 17,
2008, http://www.ppatk.go.id/berita_eng.php?nid=2786 (discussing convictions
and appeals of four Elections Commissions officials).
182 Baskoro et al., supra note 77, at 4.
183 Hardjapamekas, supra note 176; Informant Law a Must, supra note 176.
184 See Abdul Khalik, KPK’s Month-Long Secretive Probe Pays Off, JAKARTA
POST, June 2, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/02/kpk039smonthlong-secretive-probe-pays.html (describing a KPK raid on a customs service
office in Jakarta, and reporting that KPK investigators went undercover, posing as
import-export business owners to conduct transactions with corrupt customs
officials. If accurate, this would be one of the first such operations in the country).
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4.3. Access to Financial Records
While there are several Indonesian statutes that, in theory,
permit law enforcement access to bank records in corruption cases,
these provisions are limited, cumbersome, and ineffective. The
Indonesian banking laws permit the police, prosecutors, and
judges to request records from banks, but only for the accounts of
identified suspects or defendants themselves.185 In order to request
the records, the chief of the National Police, the attorney general, or
the chief justice of the Supreme Court must send a letter of request
to the central bank, the Bank of Indonesia, which in turn may
request production of the records from the relevant bank.186 Aside
from the lengthy delays inherent in such a request, a more
problematic issue is that the production of records under the
banking law is not mandatory. As a result, no enforcement
mechanism exists if the bank turns down the request. Resistance
by banks and banking authorities often results in a failure to obtain
any records under this provision.187 The 1999 anti-corruption
law188 and the 2002 law creating the KPK189 only marginally
185 Law Number 7 of 1992 Concerning Banks, amended by Law Number 10 of
1998, art. 42 (Indon.).
186 Id.
187 For example, one prosecutor with whom we spoke about the use of this
mechanism indicated that it is rarely used, in part because the Bank of Indonesia
sometimes did not respond, or did not do so in a timely manner, and that it often
questioned the law enforcement agency’s need for the records, or would deem the
stated reasons given by law enforcement as insufficient to overcome
considerations of bank secrecy.
188 Under the 1999 law, corruption cases are investigated under already
existing procedures unless otherwise indicated in the 1999 law. Law Number 31
of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, art. 26 (Indon.). The 1999 law
authorized an investigator, prosecutor or judge to ask for bank records, avoiding
the necessity for a letter from the Chief of the National Police, the attorney
general, or the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Id. art. 29(1). The authority to
request records under the 1999 law, however, continues to be limited to
information concerning an identified suspect or defendant, and does not extend to
family members, businesses or business partners, associates, or others whose
accounts might be holding corruption proceeds or whose account records may
yield evidence of a corruption crime. The request authority also appears to be
limited to the investigation of corruption offenses, and cannot be used for the
investigation of related crimes. As under the banking law, the 1999 law directs
that a request for banking information be routed to the Bank of Indonesia, and
states that the information is “subject to the prevailing laws and regulations.” Id.
art. 29(2). Although the 1999 law required the Bank of Indonesia to respond to a
request within three business days, it did not mandate that the Bank of Indonesia
actually compel the production of records. As with the banking law, the 1999 law
merely authorizes law enforcement to request certain records, and does not
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improved the procedure for obtaining bank records in corruption
cases. In its late 2006 study of the gaps between Indonesian law
and the UNCAC, the KPK indicated that since it has no ability to
compel compliance with requests for financial information on
suspects or defendants, “compliance by banks with requests for the
lifting of bank secrecy is said to still be rather low.”190
Existing law does not allow investigators or prosecutors to
even seek bank records relating to accounts held in the name of
front companies, or of relatives or associates of the corruption
target or defendant. Since corruption cases commonly involve
indirect payoffs, or proceeds hidden in the names of others, this
limitation on the availability of bank records is a serious constraint
on law enforcement.
The Indonesian money laundering law, enacted in 2002 and
amended the next year, also contains a provision for accessing

require banks to produce them. Neither the banking law procedure nor the 1999
law procedure requires that a bank maintain in confidence the fact that a request
for records has been received from law enforcement. The 1999 law also contained
a new provision authorizing an investigator, prosecutor or judge to ask a bank to
block a bank account owned by a suspect that is believed to contain proceeds of a
corruption offense. Id. art. 29(4). The law again only authorizes requests,
however, and does not mandate responses from the relevant financial institution.
In any event, absent a way of obtaining documentation concerning activity in a
bank account in a timely and confidential manner, the ability to block that account
is largely meaningless.
189 Under the 2002 law, the KPK is to conduct investigations and prosecutions
in accordance with the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code and the 1999 law,
unless the 2002 law provides otherwise. Law Number 30 of 2002, arts. 38–39
(Indon.). The new KPK was given authority to request information from banks or
other financial institutions, but as with the 1999 law, such requests are limited to
an identified suspect or defendant, and again there is no requirement that the
banks comply with the request. Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 12(1)(c) (Indon.).
The KPK was awarded stronger authority than existed under the 1999 law to
order banks and other financial institutions to block accounts, and that authority
extended not only to suspects and defendants, but to “other connected parties.”
Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 12(1)(d) (Indon.). Since the KPK cannot request
banking information concerning other parties, however, and cannot compel the
production of information concerning suspects and defendants, this authority is
somewhat illusory. The KPK was also authorized to temporarily halt financial
transactions where there was evidence connecting the transaction to a corruption
case under investigation, but there is no corresponding seizure and forfeiture
authority. Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 12(1)(g) (Indon.).
190 KPK GAP REPORT, supra note 7, at 39; see also U.N. Dev. Programme, supra
note 63, at 52 (noting the imbalance in the 2002 law between the authority
conferred on the KPK to request documents from state institutions and the lack of
a provision requiring that those institutions comply with KPK requests).
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bank records.191 The law allows an investigator, prosecutor or
judge to request records from financial services providers through
a letter signed by the chief of the National Police or a regional
chief, the attorney general or the head of a provincial prosecutor’s
office, or the chief justice of the Supreme Court or the head of a
panel of judges hearing a criminal case.192 Importantly, the money
laundering law specifically states that “the provisions of laws
stipulating bank secrecy and the secrecy of other financial
transactions shall not be applicable” to such requests.193 This is the
most permissive provision in Indonesian law with respect to law
enforcement access to bank records. Such requests are still limited
in scope, however, and in this case it is limited to the assets of
persons identified as a suspect, named as a defendant, or referred
to law enforcement by the Indonesian financial intelligence unit,
known as the PPATK. Also, such a request is an available law
enforcement tool only in money laundering investigations.
Neither the KPK nor the Special Crimes branch of the AGO—the
two agencies with prosecutorial authority over public corruption
crimes—have authority to prosecute money laundering crimes. As
a practical matter, therefore, the somewhat stronger authority to
obtain bank account records under the money laundering law is of
little assistance in combating public corruption.
Because of this lack of timely access to financial records, most
investigators and prosecutors have little experience in tracing and
analyzing financial data, and are often forced to assemble cases
without recourse to the most basic evidence of the crime. As the
KPK has observed, “the ‘follow the money’ approach to
investigation is not yet well understood and used within
Indonesian law enforcement agencies.”194

191 Law Number 15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as
amended by Law Number 25 of 2003, art. 33 (Indon.). The money laundering law
also provided that investigations should be undertaken in accordance with the
Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code unless otherwise indicated in the money
laundering law. Id. art. 30.
192 Id. art. 33(3)–(4).
193 Id. art. 33(2).
194 KPK GAP REPORT, supra note 7, at 31 (illustrating that although the PPATK
is not a law enforcement agency, its expertise is available to the KPK and AGO on
a case-by-case basis).
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4.4. Immunity and Sentence Reduction Mechanisms
There are no immunity or sentence reduction mechanisms in
Indonesia to induce or reward persons who cooperate with law
enforcement in criminal cases. Indeed, far from rewarding those
who come forward with information, prosecutors with whom we
spoke felt duty-bound to prosecute such persons, and the law does
not provide for relief in most cases.195
The law setting forth the authority of the attorney general
includes a clause permitting him to “terminate cases in the public
Within Indonesia, however, this provision is
interest.”196
understood not as an immunity mechanism to be used in exchange
for useful information, but rather as authority to dismiss cases on
humanitarian grounds in instances where the defendant is elderly
or ill, or in other extraordinary circumstances. There have been
discussions with the AGO and with civil society groups about the
possibility of promulgating a regulation that would define “the
public interest” to include situations in which defendants in
corruption cases agreed to cooperate and return their ill-gotten
gains, but, perhaps fearing the appearance of a concession to high
profile corruption defendants, no such regulation has been issued.
In any event, such a regulation might not be feasible in light of
Article 4 of the 1999 anti-corruption law, which specifically states
that restitution to the state shall not nullify the sentence of a
perpetrator convicted of corruption crimes under that law.197
A type of informal charge bargaining is sometimes used by the
police to induce cooperation. The police may charge a suspect
with a single crime, withholding other or more serious charges to
see if the suspect cooperates. If he refuses, additional charges may
ensue. This may sometimes be effective, although the lack of any
195 In the KPK case involving an investigation of Supreme Court clerks who
allegedly extorted litigants, the criminal defendant who came forward with
information that led to the prosecution hoped for leniency in his own case, but
received none. In fact, the press speculated that the defendant’s sentence, as
imposed by the Supreme Court, was harsher than it otherwise would have been.
See also Eva C. Komandjaja, Probosutedjo Seeks Graft Case Review, JAKARTA POST,
Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/12/05/probosutedjoseeks-graft-case-review.html.
196 Law Number 16 of 2004 Concerning the Prosecution Service, art. 35(c)
(Indon.).
197 Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, art. 4
(Indon.).
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written or recognized procedure means that the process lacks
transparency and accountability, and suspects cannot be confident
that cooperation will actually result in a benefit. Neither police,
prosecutors, nor judges are bound by such an agreement.
Moreover, unless the police forego charging a crime with a much
higher penalty, such charging decisions may or may not have a
material impact on the ultimate sentence imposed.
The new witness protection law includes a single-sentence
provision that appears to be the farthest Indonesia has yet come
towards contemplating some type of express legal recognition of
the value of testimony from cooperating defendants. The new
provision states that a suspect who testifies cannot be acquitted on
account of his testimony if he is legally guilty, but that the judge
may take his testimony into account in reducing his sentence.198
How the provision will function in practice is not yet clear, but it is
far from the sort of express sentence-reduction mechanism that
would be likely to induce a defendant to turn on his criminal
associates and to be of substantial assistance to investigators or
prosecutors. The provision does not authorize prosecutors to seek
a lower sentence, and does not identify how much of a sentence
reduction might be appropriate. The provision also does not
require that the cooperator provide substantial cooperation to law
enforcement, that his information/testimony be found to be
truthful and complete, or that the cooperator identify or return illgotten gains in order to qualify for a sentence reduction. Without
an effective legal mechanism to turn lower-level defendants
against more culpable figures up the chain, investigators and
prosecutors will continue to have difficulty exposing and
dismantling networks of corruption, since those most likely to be
caught red-handed—the front counter functionaries, clerks, and
delivery men—have no incentive to cooperate against their more
powerful superiors.
4.5. Prosecuting Associated Crimes
Indonesia has in place some of the criminal statutes that are
commonly used in conjunction with the enforcement of anticorruption laws. In 2002, Indonesia enacted a comprehensive
scheme addressing the crimes that constitute money laundering, a
198 Law Number 13 of 2006 on Protection of Witness and Victim, art. 10(2)
(Indon.).
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reform highly significant to the effort to update anti-corruption law
enforcement.199
The law also created a national financial
intelligence unit called the Financial Transaction Reports and
Analysis Center, known by its Indonesian acronym as the
PPATK.200 The agency has become the leading resource in
Indonesia for educating law enforcement and the judiciary about
the crime of money laundering, and has become a key player in
efforts to detect and prosecute public corruption and
embezzlement crimes in the country. Nevertheless, there have
been few money laundering prosecutions.201 We found that there
was relatively little understanding of the money laundering crimes
among most police, prosecutors, and judges with whom we had
contact with in Indonesia, but with the provisions firmly
embedded in the criminal code, and given the active role the
PPATK has staked itself out to play, this will likely change in
time.202
199 Like its U.S. counterpart, the Indonesian law criminalizes transactions
involving proceeds of certain types of crimes. Law Number 15 of 2002
Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as amended by Law Number 25 of
2003, art. 3 (Indon.). The predicate offenses include crimes of corruption, bribery,
embezzlement, and fraud. Id. arts. 2(1)(a), (b), (p), (q). The law also includes
reporting requirements for large cash transactions similar to the Currency
Transaction Report reporting requirements in U.S. law, and criminal provisions
for evading the reporting requirements. Id. arts. 8, 9, 13, 16.
200 Id. arts. 18-29b. This unit is similar to the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network in the United States. The PPTAK, like its U.S. counterpart, has the
authority to receive and analyze transaction reports from financial institutions,
make referrals to law enforcement, and provide data to law enforcement. Id. arts.
26-27, 33. The PPATK, staffed in part by former members of law enforcement
agencies, has supplied expert witnesses for use by prosecutors as forensic
accountants in fraud and corruption prosecutions. It has been reported that
reports by the PPATK on suspicious banking transactions by high level officials in
the Indonesian National Police have played a role in efforts to root out police
corruption. DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 57–58 (discussing instances of
collaboration between the police and the PPATK).
USAID is currently
implementing a project, called the Financial Crimes Prevention Project, aimed at
building capacity at the PPATK and assisting it in training officials at other
agencies about the new anti-money laundering regime. A set of amendments to
the money laundering law which would broaden the scope of the anti-money
laundering crimes, increase reporting requirements from financial entities, and
strengthen the PPATK, is currently under consideration by the Indonesian
legislature.
201 Recently, prosecutors in Jakarta charged a money laundering offense
together with a bank fraud scheme involving the loss of public funds.
202 Although the crime itself was not well understood, most were aware of
the new money laundering law, and there was general familiarity with the
concept of, or at least the term, money laundering. The PPATK is rapidly
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As noted above, the 1999 anti-corruption law created
obstruction of justice and false statements crimes relating to
corruption.203 There is no criminal witness tampering law in
Indonesia, however. Although there are ample criminal statutes
relating to, for example, murder, kidnapping, and assault,204 and a
new witness protection law is intended to provide a type of
witness security program to protect witnesses from physical
harm,205 no laws proscribe bribery of a witness, suborning perjury,
corruptly persuading a witness to give false evidence, or harassing
or retaliating against a witness.
The Indonesian criminal code has no general conspiracy
provision, but it does have statutes that extend criminal liability on
an aiding and abetting or accomplice theory.206 There are statutes
criminalizing illegal logging, smuggling, and other crimes that are
commonly associated with public corruption in Indonesia.
Indonesia is thus relatively well-equipped with substantive
criminal laws that could be brought to bear in the context of public
corruption prosecutions. A serious problem there, however, is the
fragmentation of authority to use these substantive laws. In the
civil law tradition, prosecutors have little discretion over target
selection and charging decisions.207 While prosecutors in the
United States, working with investigators, are free to follow the
evidence wherever it leads and to charge any criminal conduct that
is uncovered, prosecutors in Indonesia are typically assigned to
developing expertise and experience, and the agency itself, although small, has a
high public profile, and has been vigorously raising consciousness of money
laundering and promoting the use of anti-money laundering laws. The number of
suspicious financial transactions reported to the PPATK each year by financial
institutions has been rising steadily. Abdul Khalik, Suspicious Transactions Up
Ahead of 2009 Polls: Center, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 2, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost
.com/news/2008/02/02/suspicious-transactions-ahead-2009-polls-center.html.
203 Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, arts. 21–22
(Indon.).
204 PENAL CODE arts. 333–60 (Indon.).
205 Law Number 13 of 2006 on Protection of Witness and Victim (Indon.).
206 PENAL CODE arts. 55–56 (Indon.). There are also accessory statutes that
apply to some crimes. Id. arts. 164–65. The 1999 anti-corruption law also has a
provision which criminalizes aiding and abetting or conspiring to commit a
corruption offense, although the statute does not appear to encompass a
conspiracy theory as it is understood in common law countries. Law Number 31
of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, art. 15 (Indon.).
207 Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems:
The Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 323, 338–41 (1998).
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handle a particular alleged crime, with their authority limited
accordingly. Within the AGO, public corruption crimes are
investigated by the police and/or the Special Crimes Division, and
prosecuted by the Special Crimes Division. Most other crimes,
however, are handled by the General Crimes Division, which lacks
investigative authority. The two divisions generally handle their
prosecutions separately.208 The KPK does not appear to have any
authority to charge money laundering or other non-corruption
offenses in cases it brings before the Anti-Corruption Court.
There has been some recognition of this problem of “stovepiped” law enforcement authority.
The KPK has signed
Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) with the AGO and the
National Police to enhance coordination.209 But the inability to
utilize all substantive criminal laws to leverage efforts against
public corruption continues to be an impediment to effective
enforcement.
*****
While Indonesia has a panoply of basic laws that criminalize
public corruption and related activity such as money laundering,
its lack of an adequate investigative infrastructure established in
the criminal procedure code impedes enforcement of violations of
those laws. Despite real political will, new anti-corruption
institutions, and numerous new or revised substantive anticorruption laws, the current Indonesian criminal provisions
relating to detecting and investigating offenses allow law
enforcement to do little more than gather rumors and interrogate
suspects—a wholly ineffective strategy in corruption cases. In
order to equip law enforcement with the tools it needs to penetrate
corrupt networks, follow the money, and secure the necessary
witnesses and other evidence to really become a credible weapon
against corruption, Indonesia (like many other developing
countries) needs legislative reform that goes beyond simply
enacting substantive corruption crimes.

208 In
any event, given the limited prosecutorial involvement in
investigations conducted by the police, charging decisions are often shaped by the
nature of the police investigation.
209 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 54.
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A SHORT LEGISLATIVE AGENDA TO EQUIP DEVELOPING
COUNTRY LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR THE LONG TERM

5.1. Preliminary Considerations
5.1.1

The Timing of Legal Reform in Indonesia

The distance from reform proposal to enacted statute can be
daunting. As in many countries, the legislative process in
Indonesia is fraught with uncertainty, plagued with delays, and
buffeted by conflicting domestic political winds. In addition to
these standard features of the legislative process, the current
political environment in Indonesia is not conducive to rapid law
making, since previous elections have resulted in a number of
political parties securing significant representation in the
legislature, resulting in a multi-polar power structure in which no
one party or coalition of parties is capable of scripting a legislative
agenda.
Despite these obstacles, various factors suggest that now is an
auspicious time for criminal procedure reform in Indonesia. “We
have to acknowledge that the public is really fed up with the
conventional legal system,” a judge of the Anti-Corruption Court
recently told a public forum in Jakarta.210 Public pressure for more
demonstrable progress in the struggle against entrenched
corruption has not abated, and with the approach of Presidential
elections in 2009, both the incumbent and challengers are likely to
seek to demonstrate commitment to that effort.211 Any president
210 Independent Taskforce Drafts New Anticorruption Court Law, JAKARTA POST,
Dec.
1,
2007,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid
=20071201.H03.
211 See generally Irawaty Wardany, Faith Groups Demand Corruption Court Law,
JAKARTA POST, Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/10/23
/faith-groups-demand-corruption-court-law.html;
Clean
up
the
Judicial
Commission from Cronies, KOMPAS, Oct. 17, 2007 (unpublished U.S. Embassy
translation on file with author); Graft Has ‘No Roots in Our Culture,’ JAKARTA POST,
Dec.
10,
2007,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid
=20071210.A05; Kalla Says Fight Against Corruption Still Slow, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 6,
2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071206.A04;
J. Kristiadi, Optimize Momentum to Fight Corruption, KOMPAS, Oct. 2, 2007
(unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file with author); Desy Nurhayati,
Don’t Rest On Laurels, Says Yudhoyono, JAKARTA POST, June 13, 2008,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/13/don039t-rest-laurels-saysyudhoyono.html; Ridwan Max Sijabat, Graft Watchdog Says No Quick Fix, JAKARTA
POST, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.ppatk.go.id/berita.php?nid=2287; VP Kalla
Warns
Against
Taking
Bribes,
JAKARTA
POST,
Sept.
29,
2007,
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elected in 2009 is likely to have campaigned, at least in part, on a
platform that includes stronger measures to eradicate corruption.
The current Police Chief and the Attorney General both appear
to be committed to taking stronger action against corruption.212
The KPK, now over four years old, has become a force not only in
prosecuting corruption but in advocating administrative and legal
changes to prevent and detect corruption. New leadership has
taken the helm at the agency, which is giving it new energy and
impetus; it has already moved aggressively in bringing charges
against legislators, top officials at the central bank, Bank Indonesia,
and others.213
Indonesia helped found a new international
grouping of anti-corruption enforcement agencies, and sponsored
the second annual conference of the organization in Bali,
Indonesia, in November 2007.214 The second session of the
Conference of States Parties of the UNCAC met in Bali in late
January 2008, helping to ensure continued visibility and political
impetus to efforts to implement anti-corruption reforms.215
http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20070929.@02.
212 See Poernomo Gontha Ridho & Erwin Dariyanto, The General’s Broom,
TEMPO, Aug. 29–Sept. 4, 2006, http://www.infid.be/general_broom.htm
(describing Inspector General’s efforts to clean house within the National Police).
The current Attorney General, Hendarman Supandji, was formerly the Junior
Attorney General in charge of the Special Crimes Division, which investigates and
prosecutes corruption, and was also head of Timtas Tipikor, the inter-agency anticorruption team. He is viewed as a reformist committed to taking on corruption.
Ramage, supra note 86, at 9; La Mont, supra note 87; KPK to Prioritize Cases in ‘08
with Strong Evidence, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com
/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20080104.@01. The pressure to reform the AGO is
particularly acute following the conviction of a senior prosecutor on corruption
charges. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the recent
crackdown on corrupt officials within the AGO).
213 See Gelling, supra note 73 (commenting on the selection of new KPK
members, and detailing a number of their successful prosecutions); Abdul Khalik,
KPK Vows To Go After Lawmakers in BI Case, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 8, 2008,
http://www.ppatk.go.id/berita_eng.php?nid=2933;
Ridwan
Max
Sijabat,
Controversial Prosecutor Selected as KPK Chief, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 6, 2007,
http://old.thejakartapost.com/detailweekly.asp?fileid=20071206.@01.
See also
supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing some of the early prosecutorial
accomplishments of the KPK).
214 IAACA,
International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities,
http://www.iaaca.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
215 Desy Nurhayati, UN Conference Aims to Curb Corruption, JAKARTA POST,
Jan.
18,
2008,
http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid
=20080118.H02. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Second Session of
the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, Second Session, Jan. 28–Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.unodc.org/unodc
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Legislative action is underway on a number of fronts, each of
which could help serve as a vehicle for changes in criminal
procedure, or an impetus for further legislative reform. Soon after
Indonesia ratified the UNCAC in April 2006, a drafting committee
was formed to work on legislation to conform Indonesia to the
requirements of the Convention, and the committee is currently
active in advocating such legislation.216 The Constitutional Court
recently issued a decision ruling that the independent AntiCorruption Court was not organized in accordance with
constitutional principles. Rather than shut down the AntiCorruption Court, however, the Constitutional Court ruled that
legislators should rectify the problem through new legislation
within three years, and the pressure is on the legislature to get that
accomplished.217 A separate committee is now drafting legislation
in response to that decision, and recent drafts of the proposed
legislation contemplate a significant expansion of the AntiCorruption Court.218 An Indonesian drafting committee is also
working on a comprehensive revision to the Indonesian Criminal
Procedure Code. Drafts of the proposed new legislation include
provisions which move the country toward a more adversarialstyle system, which would be consistent with some of the needed
procedural tools described above.219 In addition, the drafting of a
new substantive and comprehensive criminal code by a committee
of experts which had been in progress for years has been
completed and submitted to the legislature. All four of these draft
laws involving substantial reforms in the country’s criminal law
system will soon be the subject of attention by national
/en/treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP-session2.html (conference materials).
216 U4 Report, supra note 43, at 92–93.
217 Mulyana Wirakusumah et al. v. Indonesia, Constitutional Court, Decision
No. 012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006 (Dec. 18, 2006) (Indon.); Harry Bhaskara, Corrupt
Could Walk Free Without New Law, JAKARTA POST, July 3, 2008,
http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20080703.H05.
218 The Formulation Team Reaches an Agreement Towards an Anticorruption Court,
KOMPAS, Jan. 12, 2008 (unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file with author);
Independent Taskforce Drafts New Anticorruption Court Law, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 1,
2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071201.H03;
The House of Representatives Put Priority in Discussing Anticorruption Courts, KORAN
TEMPO, Dec. 10, 2007 (on file with author); Regional Corruption Courts Proposed,
JAKARTA POST, Dec. 21, 2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp
?fileid=20071221.A04; Powerful New Corruption Court Proposed, JAKARTA POST, May
6, 2008, http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20080506.H04.
219 Strang, supra note 55.
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legislators.220
The National Judicial Commission recently
submitted recommendations to President Yudhoyono on several
procedural measures intended to improve the efficiency of
corruption investigations and prosecutions.221 A national law
commission has been promoting legal reform since it was created
in 2000.222 The fact that such efforts are already well-underway
and have broad popular and political support makes it far more
likely that a legislative proposal to enact procedural reforms
designed to enhance an anti-corruption efforts will be accepted and
adopted by host country constituencies.223
5.1.2.

The Breadth of Reform

In addressing the need for legislative action to enact criminal
procedure reform in Indonesia and elsewhere, it is crucially
important to resist the temptation to pursue a narrow fix,
authorizing the use of new tools and investigative techniques for
use in corruption cases exclusively by the KPK. The KPK has
observed that one of the deficiencies with current Indonesian law
regarding access to bank records is that different law enforcement
agencies have been granted different rights, creating confusion and
inefficiency.224 What is needed is not another patchwork fix, but
reform focusing on a small set of important criminal code reforms
that have broad applicability.
First, new investigative tools and techniques should apply

220 Four Draft Bills to be Submitted to the House of Representatives, MEDIA INDON.,
Feb. 20, 2008 (unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file with author). In
addition, the legislature is already considering a draft law that would significantly
amend and strengthen the anti-money laundering law. Law of the Republic of
Indonesia Concerning the Prevention and Eradication of the Crime Money
Laundering (unpublished draft law), available at http://www.ppatk.go.id/pdf
/draft_pp_tppu_english_version.pdf (English version).
221 National Judicial Commission: Simplify the Long-Winding Handling of
Corruption, KOMPAS, Nov. 7, 2007 (unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file
with author).
222 NATIONAL L. COMM’N OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDON., LAW REFORM POLICIES
(RECOMMENDATIONS) (2003) (outlining a strategy of national legal reform).
223 Jacques DeLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American
Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECO. L. 179, 289 (1999) (noting that “U.S. legal models are more likely to be
emulated and U.S. providers’ legal advice is more likely to be followed when the
substance of the U.S. prescriptions or American templates is relatively compatible
with the recipient nation’s preexisting system or its agenda for legal reform.”).
224 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 39.
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beyond obvious corruption crimes. Although the prompt for
legislative change is the need to enable law enforcement to
investigate public corruption effectively, corruption is very often a
symptom or cause of other criminal activity, such as tax evasion,
customs violations, bank fraud, prostitution, money laundering,
and (in Indonesia particularly) illegal logging.225 Even if not
apparent at the outset of an investigation, these links between
criminal activity often lead investigators in corruption cases to
evidence of other crimes, and vice versa. Leads in corruption
investigations and new witnesses and testimony can arise out of
the investigation of these and other substantive crimes. On a
strategic level, part of an effective anti-corruption strategy involves
taking steps to eradicate criminal activity that spawns corruption.
Tactically, such crimes should be investigated and prosecuted
together. Cases involving, for example, illegal smuggling and
corrupt payments to customs officials are more effectively
prosecuted when criminal charges relating to the full panoply of
conduct can be brought against defendants in a single case. In any
event, the same procedures that can be used effectively to pierce
and dismantle networks of corruption can be equally effective
against other types of complex or organized crime that plague
Indonesia.226
Second, new legislation should not exclusively enable the KPK.
Although in Indonesia and in other developing countries, forming
and equipping an independent agency may be an appropriate
solution to the problem of corruption within the existing law
enforcement institutions, it cannot replace them, either
geographically or jurisdictionally. The KPK, currently based in
Jakarta, has limited reach and limited investigative and
prosecutorial resources.227 Only the national police and the AGO
225 Peter Gelling, Forest Loss in Sumatra Becomes a Global Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
6, 2007, at A14. (“‘There are a number of ongoing investigations into corruption
that has allowed illegal loggers from all over Indonesia to go free,’ said Thomson
Siagian, a spokesman for the attorney general.”); Down in the Woods, ECONOMIST,
May 23, 2006, at 73.
226 Ohr, supra note 116, at 47–50, 53–57.
227 As noted above, see supra note 107 and accompanying text, the KPK has
fewer than 100 investigators and prosecutors, all stationed in Jakarta, while the
Attorney General’s Office has at least 5600 prosecutors distributed across the
sprawling archipelago. The AGO can prosecute all types of corruption and
related crimes, while the KPK, by charter, is specifically restricted to cases
involving significant state losses, or law enforcement or other high government
officials, or cases which have otherwise achieved widespread notoriety. Law
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are represented all across the country and can attack corruption
and related crimes on multiple levels, and only general criminal
code reform that enables those institutions to function effectively
will have broad and lasting effect in sustaining corruption reform.
5.1.3.

Issues of Legal Culture and History

Proposed procedural reforms for Indonesia or any country, of
course, must take account of that country’s legal culture and
history, which affects expectations and attitudes toward law
enforcement. Because new procedural provisions must fit within
the larger context of the country’s criminal procedure, care must be
taken to ensure that new measures do not disturb or conflict with
extant procedures, justice sector institutional structures, and the
norms under which actors in the criminal justice system operate.
Failure to integrate new measures effectively in a manner which is
“user-friendly” to the relevant actors could condemn them to
practical irrelevance, even if legislatively successful.
To a much greater extent than substantive criminal laws,
criminal procedures are a product of a particular country’s overall
legal system and legal culture. Some of the measures we propose
were developed in the context of the Anglo-American
“adversarial” legal tradition, in which the roles of prosecutors,
judges, and defense attorneys are viewed very differently than in
“inquisitorial” civil law traditions like the Dutch system that
provided the foundation for Indonesia’s criminal procedure
code.228 Nevertheless, over the last 20 years, civil law countries in
many parts of the world have initiated reforms which incorporate
features drawn from the American “adversarial” system.229
Indonesia is itself in the process of reforming its criminal

Number 30 of 2002 on the Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of
Corruption, art. 11 (Indon.). The new anti-corruption law may address this issue
in part. The current draft would expand the KPK, including the establishment of
regional offices.
228 See Langer, supra note 99, at 35–38 (discussing how American plea
bargaining assumes an adversarial conception of the players in the criminal
process which is not easily transmitted to civil countries which embrace the
inquisitorial model); see also Cousino, supra note 207, at 331–60 (discussing
changing roles of Chilean prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges in the
context of legal reform from an inquisitorial system to a more adversarial system).
229 Langer, supra note 99, at 1–3, 26–28. As Langer observes, this process of
exporting legal concepts has led to a debate over the extent to which various legal
systems have become “Americanized.” Id. at 1–3.
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procedure code, and is considering adopting some procedures that
parallel those found in more “adversarial” systems.230 The
provisions we propose require adjustments, but not a wholesale
transformation of the legal system, and so can be tailored to assist
law enforcement in operating within both common law and civil
law traditions. Moreover, although our recommendations are
informed by the U.S. experience, our legislative agenda is based
not on U.S. law, but on the UNCAC, which offers a more universal
template.231
Several considerations apply to Indonesia more specifically.
Indonesia’s history of authoritarianism and corruption among
police and prosecutors has reinforced the view that they should
have a limited ability to act unilaterally. This factor must be
considered when framing new procedures based on the U.S.
experience, where prosecutors have much greater freedom of
action. A second, more recent feature of Indonesian legal culture,
which must be acknowledged in the process for reform, is the postSuharto emphasis on “transparency.” Criminal investigations
generally are most effective when conducted out of the public eye,
and public corruption investigations in particular require secrecy
to succeed. But new criminal procedures will be acceptable in
Indonesia only if there is sufficient oversight and accountability on
their use. In addition, since there is no Fourth Amendment or
other similar constitutional checks on law enforcement action, and
no exclusionary rule to motivate law enforcement to give due
attention to such rights, rules which protect the rights of suspects
and defendants must be built into legislation authorizing new
procedures.
5.2. A Concise Legislative Package of Law Enforcement-Enabling
Reforms
A handful of legislative reforms which enable Indonesian law
enforcement agencies to deploy strategies and techniques which
have proven effective elsewhere, and which are endorsed by the
UNCAC, could have a tremendous impact on the effectiveness of
law enforcement over the medium term.
While the
Strang, supra note 55.
Commentators have observed that legal concepts based on international
norms are more readily accepted than “transplants” based on country-specific
models. DeLisle, supra note 223, at 269; Catherine Walsh, The “law” in Law and
Development, LAW IN TRANSITION, Autumn 2000, at 7, 12.
230
231
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recommendations set forth below are tailored to Indonesia,
because the legal provisions suggested address universal obstacles
to effective anti-corruption enforcement, they should be applicable
in many countries in the developing world.
5.2.1.

Whistleblower Protection

A separate whistleblower protection law is needed to
encourage reporting to law enforcement by those who observe
crimes
in
government
offices—procurement
kickbacks,
embezzlements, illegal “fees” on the public, excessive “gifts” to
official decision-makers, and other practices which are staples of
entrenched corruption—and to protect those employees after the
fact of the reporting becomes known. A typical law has several
components: a definition of whistle blowing, including what sort
of conduct is reported and to whom the reports are made, a
definition for the types of workplace retaliation which are
prohibited once a person has qualified as a whistle blower, and a
process for sanctioning the retaliator and/or restoring the
workplace benefits of the aggrieved whistle blower. An effective
law, needed in Indonesia and many other developing countries,
should focus on encouraging witnesses to expose corrupt criminal
acts undertaken by public officials, and so it must provide for the
initial confidentiality of the whistle blower’s identity, and require
that she cooperate with law enforcement in subsequent
investigation of the reported conduct.
The typical remedy provided for in most U.S. whistleblower
laws—the ability to sue—is not likely to be viewed as a serious
means of protection in Indonesia or in many other developing
countries.
With a limited bar of qualified civil attorneys,
widespread corruption in the judiciary, and the inefficiencies of
civil litigation, the courtroom is not viewed as the forum in which a
civil servant can take on her superiors and other powerful figures.
Instead, the police and prosecutors (including the KPK in
Indonesia) should be authorized to investigate any potentially
retaliatory action taken against a whistleblower, and to
recommend to the Minister and/or President that a range of
sanctions be imposed on the public officials responsible for the
retaliation. In more severe cases which amount to witness
intimidation, the police and prosecutors should be empowered to
investigate and prosecute, seeking restitution for the victim in
addition to a prison sentence for the offender.
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Undercover Authorization

Criminal procedure codes must be revised to ensure that they
contain no ambiguity as to both the legality of undercover
operations and the admissibility at trial of evidence acquired in
that manner. In Indonesia, this means that a new law, or an
amendment to the criminal procedure code, should authorize the
National Police, the KPK, and other law enforcement agencies with
investigatory power such as the Special Crimes division of the
AGO, to undertake undercover operations. These operations
should be defined to include the use of informants, cooperating
citizens or undercover officers to record contacts with criminal
suspects. Such contacts should be defined to include telephone or
in-person meetings, controlled deliveries, and other monitored
transactions.232
In order to ensure that such special techniques are not abused,
the relevant law enforcement agency should be required to
establish predication before initiating an undercover operation
against a target. That is, it should be required to document a
legitimate pre-existing basis to suspect criminal activity by the
target arising from other investigative leads, such as reliable
reports by citizens, a whistleblower’s report, observations by law
enforcement, previous proven similar criminal activity by the
target, or analysis of relevant records. Each undercover operation
should be required to be authorized in writing by a senior law
enforcement official, such as the chief of a provincial police unit or
prosecutor’s office, or by a designated unit at the investigatory
authority’s headquarters, which in Indonesia means the National
Police headquarters or the AGO in Jakarta. Such records should be
required to be maintained and provided to the defense attorney
and trial judge in the event that charges are subsequently brought
against the target. They should also be required to be available for
inspection by appropriate government inspectors or auditors after
the conclusion of the investigation.
In order to prevent entrapment of an innocent person, the
statute should require that law enforcement officers participating
in undercover operations, or informants or cooperators
participating at their direction, cannot repeatedly target the same
232 Such measures are consistent with the UNCAC’s requirement that parties
take measures to allow such special investigative techniques consistent with the
basic principles of its domestic law. UNCAC, supra note 28, art. 50.
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person in successive operations, and cannot attempt to overcome
the will of the target by excessive inducement. All recorded
contacts with the target should be required to be preserved and
made available to the defense attorney and trial judge in order to
allow the defendant to evaluate an entrapment defense, and to
ensure transparency and accountability in the use of undercover
techniques.
Undercover evidence is only useful if admissible as evidence at
trial. The undercover law should expressly permit the use of
undercover evidence as a legal form of evidence to support a
criminal conviction. Such evidence could be admitted in the form
of audiotapes or videotapes of undercover contacts with the
defendant, or of surveillance of the defendant’s activities, or law
enforcement testimony regarding the same. In order to ensure
compliance with the above-described rules, however, the trial
judge should be required to rule on the admissibility of the
evidence after reviewing the documentation concerning
predication and authorization of the undercover operation, and the
substance of the evidence itself. Evidence that was fairly collected
in accordance with the rules would be admitted; evidence that was
not would be excluded.
5.2.3.

Authorizing Access to Financial Records

Law enforcement agencies should be authorized to request
account and other documentation from banks where the request is
related to a legitimate, ongoing criminal investigation. Such a
provision should expressly provide that bank secrecy laws must
give way to legitimate requests from law enforcement. In
Indonesia, this provision would be a broader version of the
provision that currently appears in its money laundering law.233
Moreover, the scope of persons whose financial documents may be
requested must be broadened to include not only targets and
defendants but any associate, relative, or business connected to
such person or to the criminal activity under investigation or
indictment.
Consistent with Indonesia’s 1999 anti-corruption law, requests
for financial documentation to a bank or other financial institution
should be authorized through a written request from an
233 Law Number 15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as
amended by Law Number 25 of 2003, art. 32(2) (Indon.).
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authorized supervising investigator, prosecutor or trial judge.234
The authorization letter should certify that the request is part of a
legitimate ongoing investigation or prosecution, and copies of the
letters should be maintained and available for inspection by
auditors to ensure that the authority is not used for indiscriminate
snooping. One possible oversight mechanism would be an annual
report to the legislature on how many financial requests were
made by investigators from each relevant agency.
To be most effective, production of financial records, so long as
the above safe-guards are observed, should occur without an
intermediary. In Indonesia this means that rather than be routed
through the Bank of Indonesia, such requests for records should be
sent directly to the financial institution at issue, which should be
required to respond and provide information within a reasonable
period. A failure to comply with a reasonable request for records
under the statute should be referred to a central authority—in
Indonesia, the Bank of Indonesia—for the imposition of
administrative and monetary sanctions on the institution.
Repeated failures should lead to escalating sanctions including, in
Indonesia, potential loss of the institution’s status as an authorized
financial institution.
5.2.4.

Creating Immunity and Cooperation Mechanisms

Of the measures proposed, immunity agreements and a
mechanism to induce cooperation through sentence mitigation are
likely to be the most difficult to reconcile to the existing legal
systems in civil law countries such as Indonesia. In the United
States, the use of such mechanisms is often intertwined with
negotiations over guilty pleas as part of the plea bargaining
system. In civil law countries, including Indonesia, neither guilty
pleas nor plea bargaining exists.235 Still, as noted above, some civil
law countries have adopted measures that, although different in
practice from their U.S. counterparts, appear intended to generally
achieve the same objectives.236 Thus, the law enforcementenhancing benefits of immunity and sentence reduction
234 Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, art. 29(1)
(Indon.).
235 The draft revisions to the Criminal Procedure Code would introduce the
concept of the guilty plea and limited plea bargaining for certain less serious
crimes. Strang, supra note 55.
236 See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
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mechanisms, if the provisions are properly tailored to address
particulars of the existing legal system, can be transplanted.
Specifically in Indonesia, a system for granting immunity for
fewer witnesses in a case has been proposed as part of the draft
revisions of its criminal procedure code. Under this proposal, the
prosecution could be dismissed against a lesser defendant in a case
who agrees to become a prosecution witness and testify against
other more culpable defendants.237 Such a provision would go far
towards implementing a cooperating witness mechanism in the
Indonesian system.
In Indonesia as well, an alternative or additional provision
could be built on the basis of the authority that has already been
discussed within the AGO—the Attorney General’s authority to
terminate a case in the “interests of justice.”238 Such authority
presumes the pendency of a prosecution, and only provides an
avenue for relief from conviction, not from prosecution. Like the
proposed revision to the criminal procedure code discussed above,
it would thus differ from a U.S.-style grant of immunity, which is
typically issued prior to indictment.239 While this would make
scenarios in which an immunized person goes undercover less
likely, it would still provide a powerful incentive for corrupt
parties to turn on their co-conspirators and assist investigators in
locating critical evidence.
Enabling legislation based on the Attorney General’s authority
should define “interests of justice” to include a defendant’s
conduct in providing substantial assistance to the government in
the investigation and prosecution of others, together with a
confession of his own criminal conduct and the location and
repatriation of any ill-gotten gains or other restitution for harm
done, such that the public’s interest in the defendant’s cooperation
would outweigh its interest in his prosecution. These general
requirements should apply to provisions enabling immunity
grants in others countries as well. Importantly, the cooperation the
defendant provides should not be allowed to constitute merely the

Strang, supra note 55.
Law Number 16 of 2004 on the Prosecution Service of the Republic of
Indonesia, art. 35(c).
239 In any event, public suspicions about possible corrupt decision making by
prosecutors and the lack of transparency in pre-indictment immunity negotiations
would likely make a U.S.-style immunity system untenable in Indonesia at this
juncture.
237
238
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repayment of embezzled assets or other restitution, since that
would allow wealthy defendants to buy their way out of a
conviction. In Indonesia, legislation could define “interests of
justice” to mean specific cooperative measures that law
enforcement determines is of assistance in developing prosecutions
against other criminally culpable persons, or a set of factors which
the Attorney General must consider in exercising his authority.
The authority to grant immunity (or, more accurately, the
authority to terminate a case), under either proposed provision
should be discretionary with the prosecution, and not an
entitlement or right of the defendant. Each case will be different.
Some defendants may be reluctant to fully cooperate, and law
enforcement must control the ultimate benefit if it is to be an
effective inducement for defendants to come forward with
meaningful information and evidence.
Provisions authorizing grants of immunity should also address
the demand for transparency by the Indonesian public and likely
by other developing country populations. If criminal charges are
dismissed against a defendant who agrees to testify at trial against
his co-defendants, the public’s need for transparency in the
dismissal decision would likely be satisfied by the witness’s
testimony itself and the announcement of the prosecutor that the
dismissal of charges against him was in accordance with the
provision allowing a lesser defendant to testify against more
significant defendants. Under either that provision or an exercise
of the prosecuting authority’s immunity authority, where dismissal
is before trial, the prosecutor should be required to report to the
court in each case, presumably at the conclusion of proceedings, in
the form of a document that publicly discloses the scope, nature,
and reliability of the cooperation provided by the defendant, and
any other assistance, such as the return of secreted assets, relevant
to the dismissal determination. Such a requirement would
respond to the public need for transparency in such decisions, and
would maintain pressure on prosecutors to ensure that the
mechanism is not misused. The practice would be much more
acceptable to the public, the media, civil society, and other
observers if it were genuinely used to turn smaller players against
more prominent ones than if it were perceived as an escape valve
for powerful defendants.
Since there is no formal charge bargaining in the Indonesian
system and most civil law systems, a separate cooperation
mechanism would be limited to an avenue for sentence mitigation
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under certain circumstances. In Indonesia, this mechanism would
be a logical extension of the concept introduced in the new witness
protection law, in which judges are allowed to consider a
defendant’s testimony in mitigation of his sentence.240 The draft
revisions to the criminal procedure code contain such a proposed
procedure, under which a defendant may have his sentence
reduced if he pleads guilty (if allowed under the proposed revised
procedures), and helps disclose the role of more culpable
suspects.241 The new provision, if adopted, should expand the
notion of cooperation to include pre-trial cooperation by a
defendant. In order to render the provision a useful investigative
weapon for prosecutors, the new law should specifically vest
prosecutors with the authority to ask for a reduced sentence
(perhaps to as low as half of the otherwise authorized sentence) if
the defendant provides substantial cooperation.
Again,
“substantial cooperation” should be defined in the law, and the
prosecutor’s sentence reduction request should be done in the form
of a written request, available to the public, which documents the
defendant’s satisfaction of that standard.
In the case of either dismissal of charges or a reduction in
sentence for a cooperating defendant, there should be
requirements for approval at the highest levels. In Indonesia, a
dismissal under the Attorney General’s authority pursuant to the
2004 prosecution law would likely have to be approved by the
Attorney General himself or a senior assistant. Dismissal under
the proposed new criminal procedure provision, or a request for a
mitigation of sentence, should be required to be approved at least
by the chief prosecutor in the province. Other measures intended
to reassure the public as to the integrity of the process, and to
provide maximum oversight and transparency, may also be
required.
5.2.5.

Authorizing the Integrated Use of Other Criminal Statutes

As noted above, Indonesia has enacted a comprehensive set of
provisions criminalizing money laundering activities, an essential
support to corruption crime investigations. Amendments to the
law intended to strengthen the country’s anti-money laundering
240 Law Number 13 of 2006 on Protection of Witness and Victim, art. 10(2)
(Indon.).
241 Strang, supra note 55.
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regime have already been proposed by the government. Indonesia
also has some obstruction of justice laws, although a law
prohibiting witness bribery or intimidation is needed. 242
Legislation is also needed which would allow prosecutors
handling public corruption matters to charge these and any other
criminal acts discovered in the course of a public corruption
investigation. Thus KPK prosecutors should be authorized to
charge public corruption targets or their associates with other
crimes, and the Anti-Corruption Court should be authorized to
hear cases which include such charges. Similarly, prosecutors with
the AGO should be authorized to bring charges designated as
Special Crimes and those designated as General Crimes together in
the same case, using the investigative authority of the Special
Crimes Division as necessary in such matters.
6.

CONCLUSION

Many have addressed the comprehensive measures of reform
appropriate to effectively meet the problem of entrenched
corruption in Indonesia and elsewhere. We address but one
component—enforcement, and within that focus, just one slice—
criminal procedure reforms necessary to enable law enforcement to
effectively investigate and prosecute corruption crimes. We are
under no illusion that the criminal reforms advocated here are the
panacea for the deeply entrenched corruption problem in
Indonesia. Even if enacted, it would take time for investigators
and prosecutors to become familiar with these new tools and to
determine how best to incorporate them into their investigative
and prosecutive strategies. Moreover, legislative reform by itself
will have little impact without continued reform and capacity242 Indonesian law enforcement agencies also should be given express
authorization to take short-term measures to protect witnesses. Such a provision
would be a logical extension of the new witness protection law, which creates an
independent agency that administers a formal witness protection program. Law
Number 13 of 2006 on Protection of Witness and Victim, arts. 1–22 (Indon.).
While the existence of such a program is a positive step, it contemplates the
admission of witnesses on the basis of formal applications, a cumbersome and
expensive process applicable only in cases where long term protection is needed.
Id. arts. 28–36. What is needed more commonly in public corruption cases is
temporary protection—compensating a witness for staying away from home for a
few weeks, moving a witness and her family to a secure location for a brief period,
obtaining alternative identity documents for a witness, or taking extra protective
measures during or just before trial. In civil law countries such as Indonesia, such
activities must be explicitly authorized by law.
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building within the law enforcement agencies at issue. But the
limited set of procedural reforms we suggest is notable, we believe,
specifically because it is compact and consists of measures of
proven effectiveness which are endorsed by the UNCAC, to which
Indonesia and many other countries are party. When understood
and implemented together, as part of a comprehensive reform of
the structure for investigating and prosecuting public corruption,
these reforms have the powder keg potential to substantially boost
the law enforcement component of corruption eradication in
Indonesia and other developing countries.
Economists, diplomats, and other experts frequently wonder
why investigators and prosecutors are not more effective in
catching and convicting corrupt officials in many developing
nations. While there are certainly many answers to this question,
one obvious one is that investigators and prosecutors often do not
have the authority to engage in the sort of tactics needed to tackle
the unique challenges posed by complex public corruption cases.
No amount of political support, increased resources, or foreign
advice can make up for inadequate provisions in the domestic
criminal procedure code authorizing law enforcement activities.
The UNCAC articulates the aspiration of effective anti-corruption
law enforcement in developing countries. We offer a legislative
agenda to make it a reality.
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